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Surabhi Karambelkar and Andrea K. Gerlak

COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE AND
STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN THE
COLORADO RIVER BASIN: AN EXAMINATION
OF PATTERNS OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION
ABSTRACT
The Colorado River Basin has a long history of conflict among
water users that covet its limited supply. However, with an
unprecedented drought and dwindling water supplies in key
reservoirs, conflict has given way to collaboration as the strategy
of choice in addressing water issues. In keeping with the
decentralized management system in the Basin, numerous
collaborative venues have been created to address emerging water
issues; yet, there is limited information on the pattern of
stakeholder participation in these venues. Understanding who is
included and excluded from the decision-making process is vital
for forging collaborative solutions that are fair, equitable, and
balance competing water interests. In this article, we examine the
institutional design of stakeholder participation in five formal
collaborative venues: Colorado River Basin Salinity Control
Program, Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery
Program, Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program,
Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program, and
United States-Mexico Binational Forum for the Colorado River
Delta. We compare institutional arrangements at two levels,
constitutional and collective-choice, which inform the governance
and organizational structure of the five venues. We find that while
the evolution of institutional arrangements has resulted in the
broadening of stakeholder composition over time, there continues
to remain unevenness in participation within and across venues.
We build on our assessment and conclude by posing process and
outcome-oriented questions related to stakeholder participation
that will merit further attention if we are to build inclusive,
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participatory collaborative venues in the Colorado River Basin.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The first time I wrote about Terry Fulp, a key manager with the
Bureau of Reclamation, I described him as “the closest thing we
have to a guy with his hand on the tap that controls the vast
plumbing system built over the past century to distribute the
Colorado’s waters”. But I have come to realize in the years since I
published that line in 2009 that, in reality, no one has their hand
on the tap, and nobody has the ability to turn it down. Instead,
we’ve built a decentralized system with no one in charge. This
means that the only possible solutions are those that can emerge
from the collaboration of the network of actors that have a shared
understanding of the resources, of one another’s needs, and of the
complex set of rules that govern water’s use.
—John Fleck1
On January 31, 2019, the Arizona legislature authorized its representatives
to execute relevant interstate Drought Contingency Plan (“DCP”) agreements with
only a few hours of a federally-set deadline to spare. 2 Aiming to create a framework
for conserving water and protecting critical lake elevations at Powell and Mead,3 the
DCPs have received considerable media attention over the last few years as they will
determine the fate of water availability for millions of people, endangered species,
and vast stretches of irrigated farmland from Wyoming to Mexico’s Mexicali
Valley.4 These plans and state negotiations come at a time when the Colorado River
Basin is facing one of the worst droughts in history.5 The two largest savings
accounts in the Basin—Lakes Powell and Mead—are running out of water.6 Climate

1. JOHN FLECK, WATER IS FOR FIGHTING OVER AND OTHER MYTHS ABOUT WATER IN THE WEST
9–10 (2016).
2. Colorado River Basin Drought Contingency Plans, Feb. 1, 2019: Interior and Reclamation seek
formal input from Colorado River Basin states’ governors to protect Colorado River Basin, U.S. BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION, (last updated Feb 1, 2019), https://www.usbr.gov/dcp/ [hereinafter DCP]; Dustin
Gardiner, Andrew Nicia & Ian James, Arizona Legislature passes historic Colorado River drought plan
hours
before
deadline,
AZCENTRAL
(Jan.
31,
2019,
7:58
PM),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/legislature/2019/01/31/colorado-river-droughtcontingency-plan-passed-arizona-legislature/2733820002/.
3. DCP, supra note 2.
4. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY,
3
(2012),
https://www.usbr.gov/watersmart//bsp/docs/finalreport/ColoradoRiver/CRBS_Executive_Summary_FI
NAL.pdf [hereinafter RECLAMATION, BASIN STUDY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
5. Marlon Duke, Another dry year in the Colorado River Basin increases the need for additional
state
and
federal
actions,
U.S.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (May 9,
2018),
https://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/newsrelease/detail.cfm?RecordID=62170.
6. RIVER OPERATIONS, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, Lower Colorado Water Supply Report,
Nov. 5, 2018, https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/weekly.pdf (noting that on November 5, Lake
Powell was 45 percent full and Lake Mead was only 38 percent full. Based on the total system storage
values provided for the years 2018 and 2017, it can be seen that the total system storage in the Basin has
dropped to 46 percent, with a ten percent drop since the last year alone).
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change7 is further compounding the imbalance between water demand and supply in
this long over-allocated Basin.8
As the DCPs were released, stakeholders across the water user spectrum
applauded the “years of hard work and collaboration”9 that went into formulating the
draft, and called it a “major milestone”10 for creating a sustainable water system in
the Colorado River Basin. For a river basin that has been dubbed as a “Basin of
Contention”11 and has received notoriety as the “most legislated, debated, and
litigated river basin in the world,”12 the ongoing efforts to finalize the DCPs, and the
process of signing past multi-party agreements such as the 2007 Interim Guidelines,
Minute 319, and Minute 323‚ serve as examples of a broader shift from conflict to
cooperation and collaboration in addressing pressing water issues.13

7. See N. S. Christensen & D. P. Lettenmaier, A multimodel ensemble approach to assessment of
climate change impacts on the hydrology and water resources of the Colorado River Basin, 11 HYDROL.
EARTH SYST. SCI. 1417, 1417 (2007); Jonathan Overpeck & Bradley Udall, Dry Times Ahead, 328
SCIENCE 1642, 1642–1643 (2010); Julie A. Vano et al., Understanding Uncertainties in Future Colorado
River Streamflow, 95 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 59, 59, 73 (2013).
8. RECLAMATION, BASIN STUDY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 3–4, 9–10.
9. Ian James, Western states release proposed agreements for drought-stricken Colorado River,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, (Oct. 10, 2018, 2:39 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizonaenvironment/2018/10/09/western-states-release-proposed-colorado-river-agreements-droughtcontingency-plans/1583692002/ (quoting Eric Millis, the director of Utah Division of Water Resources).
10. Kevin Moran, Colorado River Drought Planning Crosses Milestone, Press release archive,
ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.edf.org/media/colorado-river-drought-planning-crossesmilestone.
11. NORRIS HUNDLEY, WATER AND THE WEST: THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE POLITICS
OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST (2009).
12. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 120
(Penguin Books, 2nd ed. 1993).
13. See e.g., Regina M. Buono & Gabriel Eckstein, Minute 319: A cooperative approach to Mexico–
US hydro-relations on the Colorado River, 39 WATER INT’L 263 (2014) (discussing the development of
Minute 319 and its innovative approach to transboundary water cooperation on the Colorado River);
Taylor Hawes, Minute 323 A U.S.–Mexico Agreement on Water that Benefits All, Colorado River Basin,
THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (Sept 9, 2017), https://www.nature.org/en-us/about-us/where-wework/priority-landscapes/colorado-river/minute-323/; In river basins, such as the Colorado, that have
limited supply relative to demand there is a higher chance of confronting conflicts linked to competing
water use claims, over appropriation, and resource degradation. In such situations, scholars contend that
collaborative forms of decision-making and governance are, and will continue to be important to balance
water allocations between various human and non-human users, Tanya Heikkila, Edella Schlager & Mark
W. Davis, The Role of Cross-Scale Institutional Linkages in Common Pool Resource Management:
Assessing Interstate River Compacts, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 121, 126 (2011); Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 189–243,
192 (2002); DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, SEAN T. MCALLISTER, WILLIAM H. CAILE & JASON S. PECKHAM, THE
NEW WATERSHED SOURCEBOOK: A DIRECTORY AND REVIEW OF WATERSHED INITIATIVES IN THE
WESTERN UNITED STATES (Nat. Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law, 2000) [hereinafter KENNEY
ET AL.] (providing a wide range of data on 346 specific western watershed initiatives as well as an
overview of the general qualities and trends that characterize watershed initiatives in the West); Patricia
Mulroy, Collaboration and the Colorado River Compact, 8 NEV. LAW J. 890 (2008) (discussing the
development of the 2007 Interim Guidelines); The shift from conflict to cooperation as the primary
resource management and governance strategy in the Colorado River Basin is representative of the
broader move towards collaborative governance in natural resource management, especially in the case
of water, see generally JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN LEWIS YAFFEE, MAKING COLLABORATION
WORK: LESSONS FROM INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2000) [hereinafter
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Modern-day management of the Colorado River Basin is marked by a
decentralized and fragmented governance system: a complex web of disjointed and
piecemeal authorities and institutions inform the allocation and use of water with no
single venue to deal comprehensively with Colorado River Basin issues.14 The
fragmentation in governance is reflected in the pattern of collaboration in the Basin.
No single venue exists for collaboration; instead a patchwork of venues brings
together stakeholders that address a range of water issues.
Although there has been considerable research examining the process of
creating collaborative venues, the challenges observed in sustaining these venues,
and some outcomes associated with collaboration in the Colorado River Basin over
the past decade, much of this research has narrowly focused on a single collaborative
venue.15 While some of this research critically assesses the pattern and challenges of
stakeholder engagement in these venues, this research is limited to two particular
collaborative venues: the Glen Canyon Adaptive Management Program and the
Lower Colorado Multi-Species Program.16 We aim to address this gap.
WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE] (building on a decade of research and numerous case studies, the book offers
lessons on the role of collaboration in natural resource management and how to make it work).
14. David H. Getches, Colorado River Governance: Sharing Federal Authority as an Incentive to
Create a New Institution, 68 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 573, 576–578 (1997); Andrea K. Gerlak, Francisco
Zamora-Arroyo & Hannah P. Kahler, A Delta in Repair: Restoration, Binational Cooperation, and the
Future of the Colorado River Delta, 55 ENV’T: SCI. POL’Y SUSTAINABLE DEV. 29, 30 (2013).
15. See e.g., Buono & Eckstein, supra note 13 at 268; Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management
of Glen Canyon Dam: The Elevation of Social Engineering Over Law, 8 NEV. L. J. 896 (2008) (discussing
the negative outcomes of collaborative adaptive management in the case of the Glen Canyon Dam
Adaptive Management Program); Andrea K. Gerlak, Resistance and Reform: Transboundary Water
Governance in the Colorado River Delta, 32 REV. POL’Y RES. 100 (2015) (discussing the emergence of
a transnational network of actors and their use of a collaborative approach in addressing water governance
challenges in the Colorado River Delta); Gerlak, Zamora-Arroyo & Kahler, supra note 14; Abigail
Sullivan, Dave D. White & Michael Hanemann, Designing Collaborative Governance: Insights from the
Drought Contingency Planning Process for the Lower Colorado River Basin, 91 ENVTL. SCI . POL’Y 39
(2019) (analyzing barriers and facilitators to collaborative governance in the Drought Contingency Plan
process for the Lower Colorado River Basin from an Arizona stakeholder’s perspective); Lawrence
Susskind, Alejandro E. Camacho & Todd Schenk, Collaborative Planning and Adaptive Management in
Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Susskind, Camacho, &
Schenk, Collaborative Planning and Adaptive Management in Glen Canyon] (discussing the experience
of implementing collaborative adaptive management in the case of Glen Canyon Dam and arguing that it
has been not been a success due to its failure to improve the quality of downstream ecosystem, or address
resource conflicts at the heart the dam’s operations).
16. See e.g., Feller, supra note 15; Susskind, Camacho, & Schenk, Collaborative Planning and
Adaptive Management in Glen Canyon, supra note 15; Lawrence Susskind, Alejandro E. Camacho &
Todd Schenk, A Critical Assessment of Collaborative Adaptive Management in Practice, 49 J. APPLIED
ECOLOGY 47 (2012) [hereinafter Susskind, Camacho, & Schenk, Critical Assessment of Collaborative
Adaptive Management in Practice]; Bret C. Birdsong, Séances, Ciénegas, and Slop: Can Collaboration
Save the Delta? 8 NEV. L. J. 853 (2008) (arguing that collaborative decisions have contributed to the
decline of Colorado River Delta and one reason for this outcome is the exclusion of ecological interests
in collaborative processes, such as the preparation of the Lower Colorado Multi-Species Conservation
Plan); Gerlak, supra note 15, and Sullivan, White & Hanemann, supra note 15, are the notable examples
of two recent studies that examine the process of stakeholder engagement in the case of the Colorado
River Delta and Drought Contingency Planning respectively. Similarly, there is some emerging research
on this front through doctoral dissertations with notable examples being Elizabeth Ann Koebele,
Collaborative Water Governance in the Colorado River Basin: Understanding Coalition Dynamics and
Processes of Policy Change (Jan. 1, 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado at
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We build on the extant scholarship of stakeholder engagement in
collaborative venues in the Colorado River Basin to offer a comparative assessment
of the institutional design of stakeholder participation across the five major
collaborative venues in the Basin. These venues include Colorado River Basin
Salinity Control Program, Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery
Program, Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Lower Colorado River
Multi-Species Conservation Program, and United States-Mexico Binational Forum
for the Colorado River Delta. We focus on formal collaborative venues that address
water challenges in the mainstem of the river and offer ongoing opportunities for
participation to ensure case comparability.17
We argue that the role of stakeholders in collaborative venues is an
important factor that can determine whether solutions are fair, equitable, and
represent diverse water interests.18 Given that collaborative approaches are likely to
continue to be the norm in addressing complex water management and allocation
challenges in the Colorado River Basin, developing a better understanding of the
structure and process for stakeholder participation in these venues is important to not
only forging much-needed solutions to balance competing uses of water and
Boulder) (on file with author) (examining how stakeholders interact, learn, and produce policy change in
three case studies: Basin Roundtables and Colorado’s Water Plan process, Colorado River System
Conservation and Pilot Program, and Minute 319) and John Gordon Berggren, Transitioning to a New
Era in Western United States Water Governance: Examining Sustainable and Equitable Water Policy in
the Colorado River Basin (Apr. 11, 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado at
Boulder) (on file with author) (discussing the principles of sustainability and equity in the context of
decision-making and stakeholder participation in the Colorado River Basin generally as well as
specifically in the case of the 2007 Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and the
Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead, Extension of Minute 318 Cooperative Measures
to Address the Continued Effects of the April 2010 Earthquake in the Mexicali Valley, Baja California,
and Minute 319: Interim International Cooperative Measures in the Colorado River Basin Through 2017).
17. See Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice, 18 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. THEORY 543, 545 (2007); Mark T. Imperial, Using Collaboration as a Governance Strategy
Lessons from Six Watershed Management Programs, 37 ADMIN. SOC’Y 281, 286 (2005) for a discussion
of the value of case comparability. Consequently, our study excludes venues such as the 2012 Basin Study,
U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY (2012),
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/index.html, and the 2016 Long-Term
Experimental and Management Plan Environmental Impact Statement for Glen Canyon Dam, U.S. DEP’T
OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & NAT’L PARK SERV., GLEN CANYON DAM LONGTERM EXPERIMENTAL AND MANAGEMENT PLAN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2016),
http://ltempeis.anl.gov/documents/final-eis/, which offered opportunities for collaboration but these
opportunities were limited to the specific study or were a part of NEPA process. This also excludes venues
that focus on specific states alone, such as the Colorado River Basin Roundtable held in the state of
Colorado, Colorado Water Conservation Board, Colorado Basin Roundtable, COLO. DEP’T OF NAT.
RESOURCE,
http://cwcb.state.co.us/water-management/basinroundtables/Pages/ColoradoBasinRoundtable.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2018), and venues that are
informal, such as the annual Colorado River Water Users Meeting, 2018 CRWUA Conference, COLO.
RIVER WATER USERS ASS’N, https://www.crwua.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2018).
18. Thomas Clay Arnold, The San Luis Valley and the Moral Economy of Water, in WATER, PLACE,
AND EQUITY 37, 37–38 (John M. Whiteley, Helen Ingram & Richard Warren Perry eds., MIT Press 2008);
Kirk Emerson, Tina Nabatchi & Stephen Balogh, An Integrative Framework for Collaborative
Governance, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 1, 11 (2012); Job Ochieng Ogada et al., Managing
Resources through Stakeholder Networks: Collaborative Water Governance for Lake Naivasha Basin,
Kenya, 42 WATER INT’L 271, 272 (2017); Lawrence Susskind, Water and Democracy: New Roles for
Civil Society in Water Governance, 29 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 666, (2013).
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effectively addressing emerging challenges, but also enhancing the future structure
of collaborative decision-making itself.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we discuss
the benefits and challenges associated with inclusion of a diverse set of stakeholders
in collaborative venues, especially those pertaining to water resources. In Section III,
we map the institutional design for stakeholder participation in the Colorado River
Basin at the constitutional and collective-choice levels. Finally, in Section IV, we
compare venues and identify a future research agenda for studying collaborative
governance and stakeholder participation in the Colorado River Basin with the aim
to further improve the inclusion of diverse perspectives in decision-making. In our
analysis, we observe that the institutional structures that govern these venues have
evolved over time to allow for greater inclusion of non-state actors in the
collaborative process. We also observe unevenness in the patterns of stakeholder
participation within and across collaborative venues that raises a host of process and
outcome-oriented research questions that merit further research.
II.
THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF COLLABORATIVE
GOVERNANCE: BRINGING STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT INTO
FOCUS
Collaborative environmental policy making – a process in which
‘stakeholders’ share with regulators the tasks of designing and
implementing remedies to environmental problems – is clearly an
idea whose time has come.
—Sara Singleton19
Over the last three decades, a new strategy of governance called
“collaborative governance” has received considerable attention in academic
scholarship, particularly in the areas of planning, regulation, policy-making, and
public management.20 Collaborative governance typically emphasizes collaboration
between and among public, private, and voluntary stakeholders.21 It is defined as a
19. Sara Singleton, Collaborative Environmental Planning in the American West: The Good, the Bad
and the Ugly, 11 ENVTL. POL. 54, 54 (2002).
20. See Chris Ansell, Collaborative Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 499,
499 (David Levi-Faur ed., Oxford University Press 2012); Ansell & Gash, supra note at 17, at 544–546
(providing examples of collaborative governance in planning, regulation, and natural resource
management); Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Tina Nabatchi & Rosemary O’Leary, The New Governance:
Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government, 65 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 547 (2005) (discussing collaboration in the context of public administration); Andrea K.
Gerlak, Tanya Heikkila & Mark Lubell, The Promise and Performance of Collaborative Governance, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 413, 413–433 (Sheldon Kamieniecki &
Michael E. Kraft eds., Oxford University Press 2013) (tracing the origins of collaborative governance in
U.S. environmental policy); Chris Huxham et al., The Challenge of Collaborative Governance, 2 PUB.
MGMT. INT’L J. RES. THEORY 337 (2000) (reviewing the practicality and challenges of collaborative
governance as it applies to public management); H. Brinton Milward & Keith G. Provan, Governing the
Hollow State, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 359 (2000) (discussing the growing partnership between
state and non-state actors in the delivery of social services); Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, supra note 18,
at 1; WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 13.
21. Ansell, supra note 20, at 500.
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“governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage nonstate stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensusoriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or
manage public programs or assets.”22 Scholars in public administration contend that
collaborative governance has emerged with the recognition that in today’s age, few
organizations can accomplish their missions by acting alone as the capacity for
solving problems is widely dispersed.23 According to these scholars, collaborative
governance, in a narrow sense, can be used as a technique to bring a diverse set of
stakeholders together around common projects and agendas.24 However, in a more
ambitious sense, collaborative governance is a strategy for reconstructing
democracy.25
Collaborative approaches have received significant attention in the
governance of natural resources; some scholars argue that the twenty-first century is
the “era of the collaborative state.”26 The rise in collaborative approaches in
environmental management and policy-making is the result of multiplicity of factors.
Some fundamental factors include: growing complexity and multi-scalar character
of some of the most pressing environmental problems, the limitation of traditional
top-down, command-and-control style of governance in addressing these complex
problems, the broadening of political power of a wide-range of interest groups,
pervasive impasses in decision-making as interest groups battle each other to a
standstill, along with the governments’ weakening legitimacy as expert decisionmakers.27 In the context of these factors, collaborative approaches are seen as the
preferred route for decision-making as they offer an alternative to the ‘top-down’
22. Ansell & Gash, supra note 17, at 544.The scholarly literature on collaborative governance defines
the concept is a multitude of ways. The definition used in this paper is more restrictive than the one used
in Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, supra note 18, at 2, or the one used by Andrea K. Gerlak & Tanya
Heikkila, Comparing Collaborative Mechanisms in Large-Scale Ecosystem Governance, 46 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 657, 658 (2006), where the scholars do not limit to only formal, consensus-oriented or a
deliberative process of decision-making. We use the restrictive definition to increase the comparability of
our cases.
23. Imperial, supra note 17; Milward & Provan, supra note 20.
24. Ansell, supra note 20.
25. Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, supra note 20, at 3; Ansell, supra note 20, at 499.
26. Harriet Bulkeley & Arthur P.J. Mol, Participation and Environmental Governance: Consensus,
Ambivalence and Debate, 12 ENVTL. VALUES 143, 144 (2003) (writing about the emergence of
participatory environmental governance, Bulkeley and Mol argue, “to put it more strongly: increasingly,
non-participatory forms of policy making are defined as illegitimate, ineffective and undemocratic, both
by politicians and by stakeholders themselves”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Post-Sovereign Environmental
Governance, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 72, 74 (2004); Tomas M. Koontz & Craig W. Thomas, What Do We
Know and Need to Know about the Environmental Outcomes of Collaborative Management? 66 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 111, 111 (2006); WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 13; Robert F. Durant et al., Toward
a New Governance Paradigm for Environmental and Natural Resources Management in the 21st
Century? 35 ADMIN. SOC’Y 643, 645–646 (2004).
27. See Örjan Bodin, Collaborative Environmental Governance: Achieving Collective Action in
Social-Ecological Systems, 357 SCI. 1114, 1 of 8 (2017); David E. Booher, Collaborative Governance
Practices and Democracy, 93 NAT. CIVIC REV. 32, 32–34 (2004); Maria Carmen Lemos & Arun Agrawal,
Environmental Governance, 31 ANN.. REV. ENVTL. RESOURCES 297, 301–302 (2006); Singleton, supra
note 19, at 55; WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 13, at 5–10; Steven L. Yaffee & Julia M. Wondolleck,
Collaborative Ecosystem Planning Processes in the United States: Evolution and Challenges, 31
ENVIRONMENTS 59, 61–62 (2003).
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forms of decision-making,28 they can overcome interest group pluralism often seen
as adversarialism and the lack of accountability seen in managerialism, 29 and they
can help overcome challenges associated with overlapping authority.30
This new paradigm in natural resource management is considered
particularly useful for decision-making around water resources. Some scholars argue
that water related issues are often characterized by complex causes, limited resources
on part of the state to address the issues, and seemingly intractable actor positions.31
These conditions provide a fruitful ground for the use of collaborative approaches.
Other scholars suggest that issues of water allocation and associated environmental
effects, due to their very nature of crossing administrative boundaries and involving
a large and diverse group of interests, require collaborative solutions.32 Others note
that issues of water allocation and management are not simply techno-managerial
problems, but are in fact social problems; competing ideologies, meanings and
values are at the heart of the struggles over access to and control over water
resources.33 These scholars contend that complex problems in which both scientific
and political considerations must be addressed, such as allocation and management
water resources, require the involvement of the people with the most to gain or lose:
water users.34 Fairness and equity considerations warrant the inclusion of all affected
interests in water management.35
28. Singleton, supra note 19, at 54.
29. Ansell & Gash, supra note 17, at 544.
30. Susskind, Camacho & Schenk, Critical Assessment of Collaborative Adaptive Management in
Practice, supra note 16, at 47.
31. Marie Claire Brisbois & Rob C. de Loë, State Roles and Motivations in Collaborative Approaches
to Water Governance: A Power Theory-based Analysis, 74 GEOFORUM 202, 202 (2016).
32. Susskind, supra note 18; See Birdsong, supra note 16, at 853.
33. See Joachim Blatter, Helen Ingram & Suzanne Lorton Levesque, Expanding Perspectives on
Transboundary Water, in REFLECTIONS ON WATER: NEW APPROACHES TO TRANSBOUNDARY CONFLICTS
AND COOPERATION 31, 31–53 See Arnold, supra note 18, at 38 (highlighting that moral economy of water
in the San Luis Valley warrants consideration of two principles: the principle of complex equity that is
based on water’s multiple spheres of meanings and values, and two, the principle of due process wherein
water policies are considered fair when they involve all affected interests, carefully consider all posed
alternatives, and rest on known and good reasons); Joachim Blatter, Helen Ingram & Suzanne Lorton
Levesque, Expanding Perspectives on Transboundary Water, in REFLECTIONS ON WATER: NEW
APPROACHES TO TRANSBOUNDARY CONFLICTS AND COOPERATION 31, 31–53 (Joachim Blatter & Helen
Ingram eds., 2001) (chronicling the expanded range and diversity of meanings of water in the
contemporary political and academic realms and arguing that definitions of water imposed by the legal,
technical, and economic approaches characteristic of modern instrumental rationality are no longer solely
authoritative); F. LEE BROWN & HELEN M. INGRAM, WATER AND POVERTY IN THE SOUTHWEST 28–45
(1987) (discussing water’s strong symbolic and emotional importance to communities beyond its
economic and utilitarian value alone); F. Lee Brown, Water Markets and Traditional Water Values:
Merging Commodity and Community Perspectives, 22 WATER INT’L 2, 2–5 (1997) (discussing the discord
between the commodity conception of water in water markets and traditional water values).
34. Susskind, supra note 18, at 666.
35. Arnold, supra note 18, at 38; Susskind, supra note 18, at 666; Margaret Wilder & Helen Ingram,
Knowing Equity When We See It: Water Equity in Contemporary Global Contexts, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF WATER POLITICS AND POLICY 50, 50–75 (Ken Conca & Erika Weinthal eds., 2018)
(highlighting participation of all affected parties in water decisions as one of five directional principles
that support water equity); But see William Blomquist & Edella Schlager, Political Pitfalls of Integrated
Watershed Management, 18 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 101, 106-107 (2005) (arguing that although
fairness dictates the inclusion of everyone in water decisions that are affected by it, such broad and open
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Indeed, the inclusion of a diverse set of stakeholders is considered a
cornerstone of “good”36 and “inclusive”37 water governance. According to
stakeholder participation scholarship, stakeholders encompass a broad range of actor
categories from “traditional”, i.e. governmental agencies at all levels of decisionmaking, to “new players” including private water service providers, citizens, water
users’ associations, or even private interest groups.38 However, we recognize that in
practice, the term stakeholder “has come to imply, if not actually confer, something
resembling legal standing . . . [s]takeholders have a right to participate in the day-today decisions of government.”39 Whereas an individual or interest group has always
had the right to participate in the ordinary political process, stakeholders are
recognized as having a right to participate outside the ordinary political process; not
every interest group gets to be a stakeholder.40

inclusion of stakeholders can further entrench power imbalances as decisions continue to favor powerful
stakeholders); Berggren supra note 16, 176–177 (reviewing literature on the challenges of inclusion of all
affected parties in water management decisions, suggests that increased participation can increase the cost
of decision-making and make it logistically impossible to succeed in making those very decisions,
especially if they involve sensitive water issues and increase the probability of misinformation or rumors
that may harm representatives’ position or ability to compromise); Katharine Jacobs et al., Linking
Knowledge with Action in the Pursuit of Sustainable Water-Resources Management, 113 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 4591, 4593 (2010) (“[P]articipatory processes can easily turn into cosmetic exercises
designed to gain public acceptance for, and to strengthen legitimacy of, decisions manipulated by the
state”).
36. Sharon B. Megdal, Susanna Eden & Eylon Shamir, Water Governance, Stakeholder Engagement,
and Sustainable Water Resources Management, WATER, Mar. 2017), at 1, 1.
37. See generally Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT FOR INCLUSIVE WATER GOVERNANCE (2015) (highlighting the importance
of stakeholder engagement and providing solutions that can be adapted and replicated to improve
stakeholder inclusion in governance and decision-making).
38. Id., at 19; William D. Leach, Neil W. Pelkey & Paul A. Sabatier, Stakeholder Partnerships as
Collaborative Policymaking: Evaluation Criteria Applied to Watershed Management in California and
Washington, 21 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 645, 646 (2002).
39. James L. Huffman, Comprehensive River Basin Management: The Limits of Collaborative,
Stakeholder-Based, Water Governance, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 117, 140–141 (2009) (“The term
stakeholders appears everywhere in the water management literature and in many of the water
management agreements discussed above. The term might be understood to signify nothing different than
the interest groups that have always participated in democratic decision-making but, in fact, the concept
has come to imply, if not actually confer, something resembling legal standing. An individual or an interest
group has always had the right to participate in the political process. Stakeholders have a right to
participate in the day-to-day decisions of government—they get a seat at the table, they might get a vote,
and they often can sue in court if their stakeholder status is not adequately reflected in the process or the
resulting decisions. In the context of virtually every decision affecting an entire river basin, this means
that the table must be very large and the demands of many competing interests must somehow be
satisfied”) (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 141 n.103 (citing Suzanne M. Michel, Defining Hydrocommons Governance Along the
Border of the Californias: A Case Study of Transbasin Diversions and Water Quality in the Tijuana–San
Diego Metropolitan Region, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 931, 959 (2000)).
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Stakeholder participation takes various forms in the United States—such as
watershed partnerships,41 roundtables,42 watershed management programs,43 multistakeholder platforms and advisory committees44— and underpins major policy
initiatives elsewhere in the world, such as the European Union Water Framework
Directive.45 In these collaborative initiatives, inclusion of diverse stakeholders is
valued not only as a normative organizing principle, but also for “instrumental”
reasons.46 Giving voice to multiple and diverse perspectives can enable thoughtful
decision-making that takes a broad view of who will benefit and be harmed by an
action,47 provide time and place-specific contextualized knowledge,48 provide
greater opportunities for representation of interests from disempowered groups,49
and create the capacity to forge solutions that are creative, enduring and effective.50
Broad stakeholder inclusion can also enhance knowledge sharing and shared learning
between stakeholders, produce substantially better outcomes,51increase legitimacy of
decisions compared to traditional approaches to decision-making,52 reduce decision
enforcement costs,53 and foster the development of fragile yet powerful intangible
assets such as trust, ownership, and accountability between stakeholders.54 This said,
scholars have noted several challenges to achieving successful stakeholder
collaboration including institutional and structural challenges,55 resource constraints,

41. See, e.g., Leach, Pelkey & Sabatier, supra note 38; Mark Lubell et al., Watershed Partnerships
and the Emergence of Collective Action Institutions, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 148, 148–163 (2002).
42. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Koebele, Assessing Outputs, Outcomes, and Barriers in Collaborative
Water Governance: A Case Study, 155 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 63, 63–72 (2015).
43. See, e.g., Imperial, supra note 17; Gerlak & Heikkila, supra note 22, 657-658; Giorgos Kallis,
Michael Kiparsky & Richard Norgaard, Collaborative Governance and Adaptive Management: Lessons
from California’s CALFED Water Program, 12 ENV’T SCI. & POLICY 631, 631–643 (2009); KENNEY ET
AL., supra note 13.
44. See generally, Jeroen F. Warner, More Sustainable Participation? Multi-Stakeholder Platforms
for Integrated Catchment Management, 22 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 15, 15–35 (2006).
45. Directive 2000/60/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000
Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water Policy, 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1;
Giorgos Kallis & David Butler, The EU Water Framework Directive: Measures and Implications, 3
WATER POL’Y 125, 125–142 (2001) (providing a concise and critical presentation of the EU water
framework directive).
46. Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, supra note 18, at 11.
47. Id.
48. Lemos & Agrawal, supra note 27, at 311.
49. OECD, supra note at 37, at 31.
50. Gerlak & Heikkila, supra note 22, at 658.
51. See Ellen Rogers & Edward P. Weber, Thinking Harder About Outcomes for Collaborative
Governance Arrangements, 40 AM. REV. PUB. ADM. 546, 547 (2010).
52. PAUL A. SABATIER ET AL., Collaborative Approaches to Watershed Management, in SWIMMING
UPSTREAM: COLLABORATIVE APPROACHES TO WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 3, 6 (2005).
53. Ogada et. al., supra note 18.
54. Uta Wehn et al., Stakeholder Engagement in Water Governance as Social Learning: Lessons
from Practice, 43 WATER INT’L 34, 34 (2018).
55. See WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 13, at 51-53; Ansell & Gash, supra note 17, at 555557; Ramiro Berardo & Andrea K. Gerlak, Conflict and Cooperation along International Rivers: Crafting
a Model of Institutional Effectiveness, 12 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Feb. 2012, at 101, 101.
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including time, money, and personnel constrains,56 and interpersonal and
organizational culture challenges.57
At the heart of these challenges, and one of the most important factors that
determines that success in collaborative water governance, is the composition of the
stakeholders themselves.58 Stakeholder composition can determine the types of
solutions that are recognized and adopted to address shared water problems; even a
seemingly diverse set of actors can produce the same outcomes as conventional
forms of governance if these diverse actors only include the dominant interest groups
and fail to represent the traditionally marginalized groups.59 The institutional design
of the collaborative process is instrumental in determining stakeholder participation
in the venue.60 We therefore conduct an analysis of the institutions that inform the
governance and organizational structure of the five formal collaborative venues in
the Colorado River Basin to identify not only the opportunities for stakeholder
engagement but also the stakeholders that are considered to have a legitimate stake
in the decision-making and outcomes of the process.
We undertake the examination of institutions at two levels. First, we discuss
the authorizing institutional arrangements, background and scope of the venue,
followed by an examination of the various governing and technical bodies that
constitute the venues. The two levels of assessment respectively correspond to the
constitutional-choice level and collective-choice levels of decision-making in the
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework developed by Elinor Ostrom and
colleagues.61 This framework has been used by scholars in the comparative analysis
of collaborative governance venues pertaining to watersheds62 and large-scale
ecosystems.63 We rely on public websites, program documents and reports to inform

56. WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 13, at 56-57.
57. Id. at 58-63.
58. OGADA ET. AL., supra note 18, at 272 (noting that success in collaborative water governance
depends on a fundamental understanding of the stakeholders).
59. See e.g. Singleton, supra note 19; Jill M. Purdy, A Framework for Assessing Power in
Collaborative Governance Processes, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 410 (2012); Marie Claire Brisbois & Rob C.
de Loë, Power in Collaborative Approaches to Governance for Water: A Systematic Review, 2015 SOC’Y
&NAT. RES. 3.
60. WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 13, at 15–21; Ansell & Gash, supra note 17, at 555–556;
Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, supra note 18, at 11; Berardo & Gerlak, supra note 55, at 101.
61. Larry L. Kiser & Elinor Ostrom, The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of
Institutional Approaches, in POLYCENTRIC GAMES & INSTITUTIONS, 56 (2000); ELINOR OSTROM ET AL.,
RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 46 (1994) (it is important to note that Ostrom and
colleagues have identified three levels of decision-making in the Institutional Analysis and Development
Framework: constitutional-choice level, collective-choice level, and operational level. In our analysis, we
are interested in identifying the type of stakeholders that are involved in the collaborative venue;
constitutional-choice level arrangements determine who can participate in the venue, and the stakeholders
themselves are evident at the collective-choice level, where policy-decisions are made. The operational
level involves day-to-day decision-making; across our specific cases the landscape of stakeholders at the
operational levels is extremely limited as only federal agencies are involved in implementing the
programs. Consequently, we do not introduce a separate operational level of analysis in our work, and
instead highlight the respective federal implementing agencies in each program at the collective-choice
level.)
62. See, e.g., Imperial, supra note 17, at 286.
63. See, e.g., Gerlak & Heikkila, supra note 22, at 657.
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our understanding of the structure and processes. In addition, we conducted several
interviews with select government officials and stakeholders participating in these
collaborative venues to better understand the nuances and peculiarities of the
collaborative venue. Through our analysis, we aim to highlight the pattern of
stakeholder inclusion and exclusion in these venues and determine research themes
that merit further attention if we are to improve the stakeholder engagement process,
diversity of representative groups, and outcomes of these collaborative venues.
III.
A.

MAPPING THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR STAKEHOLDER
ENGAGEMENT IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN
Constitutional-choice level Structure: Authorizing Institutional
Arrangements, Background, and Scope of the Collaborative Venues

In the Colorado River Basin, federal and state actors have created
collaborative venues to address the tensions between growing societal demands for
water, emerging considerations for environmental water needs, and declining water
resources. In this section, we present a brief discussion of the collaborative venues,
highlighting the events that led to the creation of these venues, their “constitutionalchoice level” structure, and the authorizing policies that created the venues (see
Table 1 for summary). By defining the topical and geographical boundaries of the
venues, constitutional-choice level structures play an important role in defining the
landscape of stakeholders that can participate in the collaborative process at the
collective-choice level. In the subsequent sections, we trace the changes in the
constitutional-choice level structure across the venues. We begin with the discussion
of the oldest venue: the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program.
1.

Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program

The creation of the oldest collaborative venue, the Colorado River Basin
Salinity Control Program (“Salinity Program”), was rooted in tensions over the high
salt concentrations in water deliveries made by the United States to Mexico64 under
the 1944 Water Utilization Treaty.65 A series of negotiations between the two nations
to address the salinity concerns culminated in the passage of Minute 242.66 To fulfil
its obligation under Minute 242, United States Congress passed the Colorado River
Basin Salinity Control Act in 1974,67 which directed the Secretary of the Interior to
proceed with a program68—the Salinity Program—to enhance and protect the quality
of water available in the Colorado River for use in the United States and the Republic
of Mexico. This program serves as a forum for federal and state agencies “to work
cooperatively with numerous regional water management agencies, hundreds of

64. MILTON N. NATHANSON, UPDATING THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS 217 (1980).
65. Treaty with Mexico Relating to the Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers
and of the Rio Grande, Mex.-U.S., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219.
66. Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n , Permanent and Definite Solution to the International Problem
of the Salinity of the Colorado River, Minute No. 242, Mex.-U.S., Aug. 30, 1973,
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/min242.pdf.
67. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Public Law 93-320, 88 Stat. 266–275 (1974).
68. See, Id. § 101 (a).
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local companies, and thousands of individual water users to reduce and maintain salt
concentrations in the river at an acceptable level as determined by numerical water
quality standards.”69 Whereas the topical scope of this program is limited to salinity
issues, its geographic scope extends the entire course of the Colorado River in the
United States.70
2.

Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program

In the early 1970s, when Congress passed the Colorado River Basin Salinity
Control Act, a key piece of environmental legislation was also signed into law, the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”).71 This act has served as the leading edge
of environmental law,72 and since its humble beginnings has become a “lightning rod
for conflict.”73 In the Upper Basin of the Colorado River, ESA listing of three fish
species—humpback chub, bonytail, and colorado pikeminnow74—sparked conflict
between water development interests and environmental interests that respectively
wanted to develop and conserve water.75 In 1982, the ESA was amended; this
amendment directed Federal agencies to coordinate with state and local agencies to
resolve water resource issues while considering the conservation of endangered
species.76 Despite the 1982 ESA amendment, the conflict and deadlock between
water developers and environmental interests escalated.77 However, recognizing that

69. ROBERT BOYD & COLE GREEN, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL PROGRAM, 2018-2023 (2018)
[hereinafter BOYD & GREEN].
70. U. S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ET AL, COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL PROGRAM FEDERAL
ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 (2011) (the geographic scope of the program has not
been delineated in the authorizing legislation, the extent of the program along the entire course of the
Colorado River in the United States is evident from reports by implementing federal agencies. See Table
3 noting the status of adoption of salinity standards and plan of implementation updates in all seven Basin
States).
71. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1973).
72. Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional
Challenges of New Age Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J., 50, 51 (2001) (citing Joseph L.
Sax, The New Age of Environmental Restoration, 41 WASHBURN L. J. 1 (2001)).
73. Id. at 50 (noting that the ESA had humble beginnings as an uncontroversial expression of concern
for charismatic species but “has metamorphosed into a lightning rod for conflict and is a case study in
political experimentation”).
74. U. S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR ENDANGERED
FISH SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN, (1987) [hereinafter FWS, FINAL RECOVERY
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM].
75. Id. at 1-6; Raney Lamey, Clare Ryan, Rachel Selk & Julia Wondolleck, Case Study #1 Recovery
Implementation Program for the Endangered Fishes of the Upper Colorado River Basin, in NEGOTIATING
SURVIVAL: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
TECHNIQUES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN ENDANGERED SPECIES AND DEVELOPMENT, 1-1, 13 to 1-4 (Steven L. Yaffee & Julia M. Wondolleck, Administrative Conference of the United States, Sept.
1994) [hereinafter LAMEY ET. AL.].
76. LAMEY ET. AL. supra note 75, at 1-4 (noting further that this amendment was added to the ESA
to specifically address the conflicts that had developed between water development and conservation
interests in the Upper Colorado and Platte River Basins).
77. LAMEY ET. AL., supra note 75, at 1-5; John Loomis & Jeffery Ballweber, A Policy Analysis of the
Collaborative Upper Colorado River Basin Endangered Fish Recovery Program: Cost Savings or Cost
Shifting?, 52 NAT. RES. J. 337, 340-341 (2012).
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a confrontational approach would inhibit progress towards the recovery of listed
species as well as lend uncertainty to the future of water resource development in the
Upper Basin, water and environmental interests in the Upper Basin chose dialogue. 78
To facilitate discussions and negotiations, a forum was created called the Upper
Colorado River Basin Coordinating Committee.79 Members in this forum included
federal and state agencies along with representatives from water development and
environmental interests.80 This forum was tasked with identifying “reasonable and
prudent alternatives that would preserve the species while permitting new water
development to proceed in the upper basin.”81 Through cooperative efforts, the
Committee ultimately proposed the development of the Recovery Implementation
Program for the Endangered Fish Species in the Upper Colorado River Basin
(“Recovery Program”) to “provide a mechanism to resolve the Section 7 conflict in
the Upper Basin” in 1987.82
After the completion of an Environmental Assessment of the Recovery
Program, it was formally endorsed, adopted, and implemented through a Cooperative
Agreement between the Secretary of the Interior, Governors of Colorado, Utah and
Wyoming, and the Administrator of Western Area Power Administration on January
22, 1988.83 Much like the Salinity Program, the Recovery Program is implemented
through a federal-state partnership. However, with the recognition of water and
environmental interests in the Program, this partnership additionally includes these
non-state actors: the Colorado Water Congress, the Utah Water Users Association,
the Audubon Society, the Colorado Wildlife Federation, the Environmental Defense
Fund, and The Nature Conservancy.84 The Recovery Program is also similar to the
Salinity Program in having a limited topical scope: management and recovery of
three endangered fish species and the management of razorback sucker, while
providing for new water development to proceed in the Upper Basin. 85 The
geographic extent of the program covers the Upper Colorado River Basin above Glen
Canyon Dam, excluding the San Juan River Subbasin.86

78. LAMEY ET. AL., supra note 75,at 1-5; Loomis & Ballweber supra note 77, at 341.
79. LAMEY ET. AL., supra note 75, at 1-5.
80. Id. at 1-5.
81. Id. at 1-6.
82. Id. at 1-10, 1-11.
83. Cooperative Agreement for Recovery Implementation Program for Endangered Species in the
Upper Colorado River Basin, Jan. 22, 1988, http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/documentspublications/foundational-documents/cooperativeagreement.pdf [hereinafter Cooperative Agreement
1988] (extended in 2001, http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/documents-publications/foundationaldocuments/extension.pdf
and
in
2009,
http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/documentspublications/foundational-documents/2009extension.pdf).
84. LAMEY ET. AL., supra note 75, at 1-8, 1-9; About the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish
Recovery Program, UPPER COLO. RIVER ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM, (last visited Oct. 13th,
2018) http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/general-information/about.html [hereinafter About the
Endangered Fish Recovery Program].
85. Cooperative Agreement 1988, supra note 83.
86. Id.
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Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program

The creation of Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program has its
roots in the tension over operating Glen Canyon Dam to both maximize power
production and protect natural and cultural resources.87 In response to public and
federal agency concerns over the fluctuating releases at the dam and its impact on
downstream resources, the Secretary of the Interior directed the United States Bureau
of Reclamation (“Reclamation”) to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(“EIS”) on Glen Canyon Dam operations in 1989.88 As the EIS preparation was
underway, Congress passed the Grand Canyon Protection Act in 1992.89 This act
required Reclamation to operate Glen Canyon Dam “to protect, mitigate adverse
impacts to, and improve the values for which Grand Canyon National Park and Glen
Canyon National Recreation Area were established, including, but not limited to
natural and cultural resources and visitor use.”90 This requirement was in addition to
Reclamation’s traditional mandate for operating the dam to generate the “greatest
practicable amount of power that can be sold at firm power and energy rates”91 and
meet Compact and treaty obligations. To balance the diverse goals involved in the
management of Glen Canyon Dam, the final EIS published in 1995 proposed a
process of “adaptive management” to assess the effects of dam operations on
downstream resources and inform future modifications of dam operations based on
these assessments.92 To undertake such adaptive management, the EIS called for the
creation of the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program (“Glen Canyon
AMP”).93 The Secretary of the Interior authorized the Glen Canyon AMP by signing
a Record of Decision in 1996.94
The Glen Canyon AMP is intended to “provide an organization and process
for a collaborative, science-based integration of monitoring and research information
to make formal recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior, 95 which can result
in some additional operational changes in the way Glen Canyon Dam is operated.96
In addition, the Glen Canyon AMP is expected to ensure that the primary mandate
of the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 is met through future advances in
information and resource management.
87. These tensions are discussed in Helen Ingram, A. Dan Tarlock & C. R. Oggins, The Law and
Politics of the Operation of Glen Canyon Dam, in COLO. RIVER ECOLOGY AND DAM MGMT.:
PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMP. MAY 24–25, 1990 SANTA FE, N.M. 10 (Natl. Acad. Press Wash. DC) (1991);
U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM,
COLO. RIVER STORAGE PROJECT, ARIZ. FINAL ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT, 1–3 (1995) [hereinafter
RECLAMATION, GLEN CANYON FEIS 1995].
88. RECLAMATION, GLEN CANYON FEIS 1995, supra note 87, at 2.
89. Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992).
90. Grand Canyon Protection Act §1802.
91. 43 U.S.C. § 620(f) (1962).
92. RECLAMATION, GLEN CANYON FEIS 1995, supra note 87, at 34.
93. Id.
94. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM FINAL
ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT (1996) [hereinafter U. S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GLEN CANYON ROD
1996].
95. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, STRATEGIC PLAN GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT.
PROGRAM FINAL DRAFT, 9 (2001) [hereinafter RECLAMATION, STRATEGIC PLAN FINAL DRAFT 2001].
96. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GLEN CANYON ROD 1996, supra note 94, at Appendix G-9.
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Compared to the Salinity Program and the Recovery Program that focus on
singular issues of salinity and recovery of endangered fish species respectively, the
Glen Canyon AMP has a multi-issue topical scope. Specifically, the Glen Canyon
AMP covers issues related to fish populations and habitat, endangered species, water
quality, sediment storage, recreation, power production, and cultural resources. The
2001 Strategic Plan for Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program identifies
twelve co-equal goals or management objectives to guide the Glen Canyon AMP.97
Scholars within and outside the Glen Canyon AMP criticized the initial institutional
design of the program for failing to prioritize among the various competing resource
goals and to develop quantified targets for goals and objectives thereby limiting the
possibility for meaningful trade-off evaluations by decision-makers.98 In 2012, the
Adaptive Management Work Group within the Adaptive Management Program
adopted a set of Desired Future Conditions (“DFCs”) to help guide future
experimentation, research, and monitoring, and proactive development of future
experimental plans.99 The intent of adopting such DFCs was to remedy the lack of
guiding principles in implementing the 12 Glen Canyon AMP goals. The DFCs
themselves were not internally prioritized; however, they provided further guidance
on the resource goals, objectives, future desired conditions and metrics for assessing
progress towards meeting the stated resource goals.100 The 2016 “Record of
Decision” for the Glen Canyon Dam Long-Term Experimental and Management
Plan Final Environmental Impact Statement narrowed the resource goals to 11; yet,
much like the DFCs, it did not prioritize the competing goals.101
While Glen Canyon AMP’s topical scope is broader than the Salinity
Program and the Recovery Program, its geographic scope is narrower than the two
older collaborative venues. The geographic scope of the Glen Canyon AMP is
limited to the Colorado River mainstem corridor and interacting resources in
associated riparian and terrace zones, located primarily from the forebay of Glen
Canyon Dam to the western boundary of Grand Canyon National Park; it includes
the area where dam operations impact physical, biological, recreational, cultural, and
other resources.102
4.

Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program

The Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program (“LCR
MSCP”) has a similar history to the Upper Basin Recovery Program in that it

97. RECLAMATION, STRATEGIC PLAN FINAL DRAFT 2001, supra note 95, at 11.
98. Susskind, Camacho, & Schenk, Collaborative Planning and Adaptive Management in Glen
Canyon, supra note 15, at 25; John F. Hamill & Theodore S. Melis, The Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive
Management Program: Progress and Immediate Challenges in RIVER CONSERVATION AND MGMT. 325–
338, 332 (Philip J. Boon & Paul J. Raven eds., 2012).
99. Memorandum from Sec’y of the Interior on Report and Recommendation from Glen Canyon
Dam Adaptive Mgmt. Work Group Fed. Advisory Comm. Meeting Feb. 22-23 2012, 4-16 (Apr. 30, 2012)
(on file with author; however, the Desired Future Conditions listed in the Memorandum can be accessed
at http://gcdamp.com/images_gcdamp_com/3/36/DFCs_2012.pdf).
100. See id.
101. U. S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, GLEN CANYON DAM LONG-TERM
EXPERIMENTAL AND MGMT. PLAN FINAL ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT, APPENDIX A 2–3 (2016).
102. RECLAMATION, STRATEGIC PLAN FINAL DRAFT 2001, supra note 96, at 38.
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developed following a series of species listing under the ESA.103 Following the 1994
designation of critical habitat for the two fish species in the Lower Basin of the
Colorado River, Reclamation and United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”)
met to discuss the development of a Biological Assessment under section 7 of the
ESA for the operations and maintenance of the Lower Basin of the Colorado River.104
At the same time, non-federal public agencies, private organizations, and Indian
Tribes in the three Lower Basin States (Arizona, California, and Nevada) initiated a
discussion and planning process to develop and implement a multi-species
management program, as they recognized the need for a long-term program to
balance the interests of water users with conservation of endangered species. 105 The
federal and non-federal interests coalesced in 1994 when representatives from the
U.S. Department of the Interior—including the Bureau of Land Management,
Reclamation, FWS, and National Park Service—signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with water, power, and wildlife interests in the three Lower Basin
States to develop the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program.106
Following the signing of the MOA,107 the parties signed a Joint Participation
Agreement in 1997,108 which formally created the Steering Committee to develop
the Program, implement interim conservation measures, and prepare ESA
compliance documents, including both Section 10 applications for non-Federal
entities and Section 7 Biological Assessments for federal agencies.109

103. See History, LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM,
https://www.lcrmscp.gov/history.html (last updated Dec. 21, 2018) (noting that from 1967 to 1991, Yuma
clapper rail [endemic bird of the Lower Colorado River], and Bonytail and Razorback sucker [native fish
of the Lower Colorado River] were listed as endangered under the ESA. In 1994, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service designated the Lower Colorado River as a “critical habitat” for the two fish species: the
razorback sucker and bonytail. In 1995, the southwestern willow flycatcher was federally listed as
endangered. With the listing of several species as endangered along the lower Colorado River, and with
the prospect of more species becoming listed in the future, there was a clear need for a long-term program
that would balance the interests of water users with conservation of endangered species).
104. Id.
105. Michael D. White, The Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program, 12 ARIZ.
RIPARIAN COUNCIL 1, 3 (1999).
106. See LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM FUNDING AND
MANAGEMENT
AGREEMENT,
at
6–7
(2005),
https://www.lcrmscp.gov/publications/fund_mgt_agr_apr05.pdf [hereinafter LCR MSCP, FUNDING AND
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT] (In August 1995, signatories of the Memorandum of Understanding entered
into a “Memorandum of Agreement for Development of a Lower Colorado River Multi-Species
Conservation Program”, which was clarified in a Memorandum of Clarification, signed in June 1996, to
acknowledge Federal activities within the 100-year floodplain of the Lower Colorado River which are
subject to section 7 consultation under the Endangered Species Act and to remove any implication of a
guarantee of exemption for the signatories from the requirements of that act. Together the memoranda are
referred to as the MOA).
107. See Id. for clarification.
108. LOWER COLORADO RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM JOINT PARTICIPATION
AGREEMENT AMONG THE U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, STATE OF ARIZ., STATE OF CALI., AND THE STATE
OF
NEV.,
at
1
(1997),
http://www.riversimulator.org/Resources/LawOfTheRiver/HooverDamDocs/Supplements/1997MSCPjo
intParticipationAgreement.pdf [hereinafter LCR MSCP, JOINT PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT]
109. Id. at 3.
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The final programmatic documents and EIS were prepared in 2004, after
which, U.S. Department of the Interior Secretary Gail Norton signed the Record of
Decision in 2005 formally authorizing the LCR MSCP.110 The parties involved in
the LCR MSCP also signed a Funding and Management Agreement in 2005, which
continues to guide the management and implementation activities of the program.111
LCR MSCP was designed to implement and harmonize Secretary of the Interior’s
statutory responsibilities under the Law of the River and the ESA.112 According to
the Record of Decision, the LCR MSCP is a forum where federal and non-Federal
entities can work cooperatively for a three-fold purpose: i) to conserve habitat and
work towards the recovery of threatened and endangered species, as well as reduce
the likelihood of additional species being listed, ii) to accommodate present water
diversions and power production and optimize opportunities for future water and
power development, to the extent consistent with the law, and iii) to provide the basis
for incidental take authorizations.113 Much like the Upper Basin Recovery Program,
the topical focus on the program is limited to conserving specific species of fish,
birds, mammals, reptiles, amphibians, insects and plants.114 The geographical scope
of the program is also limited to the 400 miles of the lower Colorado River from
Lake Mead to the southernmost border with Mexico, and includes Lakes Mead,
Mohave, and Havasu, as well as the historic 100-year floodplain along the main stem
of the lower Colorado River.115
5.

United States-Mexico Binational Forum for the Colorado River
Delta

The history of creation of the United States-Mexico Binational Forum for
the Colorado River Delta (“Binational Forum”),116 is rooted, in part, in the conflict
over the narrow scope of the LCR MSCP and in part in the ongoing activities of an
informal coalition of environmental organizations and research scientists that were
working to identify pathways to restore the Colorado River Delta (“Delta”) in the

110. U. S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES
CONSERVATION PLAN, at 1, 3 (2005), https://www.lcrmscp.gov/publications/rec_of_dec_apr05.pdf
[hereinafter U. S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, LCR MSCP ROD 2005].
111. LCR MSCP, FUNDING AND MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 106, at 5-6.
112. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, LCR MSCP ROD 2005, supra note 108, at 1.
113. Id. at 2.
114. Habitat Conservation Plan Conservation Concepts, LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES
CONSERVATION PROGRAM, https://www.lcrmscp.gov/conservation/conservation_concepts.html (last
updated Dec. 20, 2018).
115. LOWER COLORADO RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM, VOL. II: FINAL HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLAN 1-9 to 1-10 (2004), https://www.lcrmscp.gov/publications/hcp_volii_dec04.pdf.
116. It must be noted here that we use the name ‘U.S.-Mexico Binational Forum for the Colorado
River Delta’ to refer to the forum that has been created by a host of Minutes between United States and
Mexico to address water needs of the Colorado River Delta, among other water concerns. These Minutes
have created a forum, similar to the other collaborative venues in the Colorado River Basin, that regularly
brings together state and non-state actors. There is no specific name given to this forum, unlike the other
collaborative venues; however, for ease of reference, we use the name ‘U.S.-Mexico Binational Forum
for the Colorado River Delta.’ Readers should therefore use caution before using this name for the forum,
as it is by no means a formal, official name.
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1980s and 1990s.117 Environmental groups that were part of the LCR MSCP process
prior to its formal authorization criticized the scope of the program; they held that
the myopic focus of the LCR MSCP only on the United States portion of the
Colorado River and its failure to consider habitat for endangered species in
Mexico—particularly the Delta and Gulf of California—was a missed opportunity
as it would provide the “greatest benefit” of implementing the program. 118 The LCR
MSCP did not account for the concerns of the participating environmental groups;
consequently, these groups sued Reclamation over the decision to exclude the Delta.
119
The environmental groups lost in court.120 After failed efforts at litigation several
environmental organizations, such as Defenders of Wildlife and Sierra Club,
disengaged from the network of actors in the informal coalition that were already
working on restoration of the Delta.121
The disengagement of litigious groups created space for a smaller set of
non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) to forge an international consensus and
identify collaborative pathways to address issues pertaining to the Delta. 122 These
NGOs performed a range of on-the-ground restoration efforts, policy analysis, and
scientific data gathering and monitoring that was aimed at improving the Delta’s
conditions.123 Recognizing the efforts of the NGOs, particularly their initiation of an
informal dialogue that brought together state and non-state actors in the United States
and Mexico124 and their participation in the formulation of Surplus Guidelines,125
these NGOs were invited to a binational “core group” of actors in 2008.126 The core
group was a part of a binational forum convened by International Boundary and
Water Commission (“IBWC”)127 to discuss joint cooperative actions related to the
Colorado River, including protection and enhancement of habitat in the Delta.128 The
IBWC is the only agency with binational authority over surface water resources in

117. Gerlak, supra note 15, at 105–106; Jennifer Pitt, Daniel F. Luecke, Michael J. Cohen & Edward
P. Glenn, Two Nations, One River: Managing Ecosystem Conservation in the Colorado River Delta, 40
NAT. RES. J. 819, 831–832 (2000); DANIEL F. LUECKE ET AL., A DELTA ONCE MORE: RESTORING
RIPARIAN AND WETLAND HABITAT IN THE COLORADO RIVER DELTA, 7 (EDF Publi’n, 1999); Jennifer Pitt
& Eloise Kendy, Shaping the 2014 Colorado River Delta pulse flow: Rapid environmental flow design
for ecological outcomes and scientific learning, 106 ECOL. ENG. 704, 706 (2017).
118. Birdsong, supra note 16, at 862–863.
119. Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 53, 67-69 (D.D.C. 2003).
120. Id.
121. Gerlak, supra note 15, at 107.
122. Id. (noting that this smaller set of NGOs included the two NGOs from Mexico, Pronatura and the
Sonoran Institute, along with the national environmental NGOs, EDF and The Nature Conservancy).
123. See Gerlak, Zamora-Arroyo, & Kahler, supra note 14, at 35–36; Gerlak, supra note 15, at 107–
109.
124. Gerlak, supra note 15, at 109–110.
125. Id.
126. Francisco Zamora-Arroyo et al., Collaboration in Mexico: Renewed Hope for the Colorado River
Delta, 8 NEV L. J. 871, 881 (2008); Gerlak, Zamora-Arroyo, & Kahler, supra note 14, at 36.
127. Gerlak, Zamora-Arroyo, & Kahler, supra note 14, at 36.
128. U.S. and Mexico Agree to Discuss Joint Cooperative Actions Related to the Colorado River, U.S.
DEP’T
OF
THE
INTERIOR
(Aug.
13.
2007),
available
at
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/archive/news/archive/07_News_Releases/070813_statement.htm
l.
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the border region,129 and as such, had traditionally limited the inclusion of non-state
actors in its activities.130 The 2007–2008 stakeholder process was the first time in
history that IBWC invited NGOs to a binational forum.131
In 2010, Commissioners at the IBWC formalized the stakeholder process
that began in 2007–2008 by signing Minute 317 titled “Conceptual Framework for
U.S.-Mexico Discussions on Colorado River Cooperative Actions.”132 Minute 317
resulted in the creation of a formal binational forum that represented stakeholders
from the NGOs and government agencies in United States and Mexico. Minute
319133 and the more recent Minute 323134 further supported this forum and extended
its operations to 2026. Unlike the other collaborative venues in the Colorado River
Basin where a fixed constitutional structure determined the stakeholder composition
at the inception of the venue, the constitutional structure in the case of the Binational
Forum evolved over the years to include NGOs as a stakeholder in the forum.
While protecting and restoring the Delta was the focal point of activities of
the early informal coalition, the formal binational forum that was created in 2010
and continues to remain operational today has a broader topical focus. Per Minute
323, the range of topics covered include coordinating Basin operations, creating and
implementing a Water Scarcity Contingency Plan, addressing the infrastructural
damage caused by the 2010 earthquake in Mexicali Valley in Baja California,
addressing salinity issues associated with Colorado River water delivery to Mexico,
addressing daily flow variability arriving in Mexico, providing for environmental
water needs (especially for the benefit of the Delta riparian corridor and estuary),
and identifying opportunities to develop projects and implement actions that
conserve and augment Colorado River water supplies.135
Unlike the Glen Canyon AMP or the LCR MSCP, the geographic scope of
the activities carried out by the binational forum are not clearly defined. The
activities appear to primarily focus on the Lower Basin portion of the Colorado
River, the United States-Mexico limitrophe section of the River, and the extent of
the River within Mexico.136

129. Pitt, Luecke & Glenn, supra note 118, at 836–837.
130. Gerlak, supra note 15, at 105.
131. Zamora-Arroyo et al., supra note 127, at 881; Gerlak, supra note 15, at 110.
132. Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, Conceptual Framework for U.S.-Mexico Discussions on
Colorado River Cooperative Actions, Minute No. 317, T.I.A.S. 10-630 (June 17, 2010),
https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute_317.pdf [hereinafter IBWC, Minute 317].
133. Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, Interim International Cooperative Measures in the Colorado
River Basin Through 2017 and Extension of Minute 318 Cooperative Measures to Address the Continued
Effects of the April 2010 Earthquake in the Mexicali Valley, Baja California, Minute No. 319, T.I.A.S.
12-1127 at 1-3 (Nov. 20, 2012), https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute_319.pdf [hereinafter
IBWC, Minute 319].
134. Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, Extension of Cooperative Measures and Adoption of a
Binational Water Scarcity Contingency Plan in the Colorado River Basin, Minute No. 323, T.I.A.S. 17927.1 (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min323.pdf [hereinafter IBWC, Minute
323].
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Table 1: Authorizing Institutional Arrangements, Topical, and Geographical Scope
of the Collaborative Venues in the Colorado River Basin

B.

Collective-Choice Level Structure: Mapping Organizational Components
and Stakeholder Participation in the Collaborative Venues

To carry out activities covered in the topical scope of each of the five
venues, collective-choice level bodies have been established that perform a range of
duties related to the management and implementation of the programs. In this
section, we describe the governance and organizational structure of each of the five
venues with a focus on the stakeholder composition of the venues. We look at the
actors and organizations with a seat at the table as well as the opportunities for
inclusive participation. For each case, we first discuss the stakeholder composition
for the main governing body, followed by a discussion of the composition in
supporting bodies, such as the technical groups within the venue. We provide an
overview of the five venues in Table 2 at the end of the section.
1.

Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program

The governance structure of the Salinity Program includes a main advisory
body—Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Advisory Council (“Advisory
Council”)—and Program Partner Agencies: four Federal Agencies within the U.S.
Department of the Interior, the Natural Resources Conservation Service within the
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Department of Agriculture, United States Environment Protection Agency, and
seven Basin States.137 The Advisory Council was created under the Colorado River
Basin Salinity Control Act and includes up to three appointed representatives from
each Basin State.138 There is no term limitation for the appointed members as they
serve at the discretion of the Governor of each Basin State.139 The Advisory Council
also includes one Designated Federal Officer from Reclamation to perform such
duties as approving and calling Council meetings, preparing and approving agendas,
and adjourning meetings in the public interest.140 The Advisory Council has no
decision-making authority; however, it performs advisory functions such as
reviewing reports on the progress of the Salinity Program and providing
recommendations to both the Secretary of the Interior and Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency on appropriate studies of further projects,
techniques, or methods.141
The Salinity Program also includes a parallel organizational body to the
Advisory Council called the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum (“Salinity
Forum”) that was established through stakeholder initiative. The Salinity Forum was
established in 1973 by members of the seven Basin States to coordinate with federal
agencies on the implementation of the Salinity Program, work with Congress on the
authorization and funding of the Program, disseminate information on salinity
control, and otherwise promote efforts to reduce the salt loading to the Colorado
River.142 The membership of the Salinity Forum consists of up to three
representatives of each Basin State appointed by the respective Governor of each
State, and each state has one vote.143 Members are typically selected from state water
quantity and water quality agencies as well as from major water user agencies. 144 As
the Salinity Forum was a creation of stakeholder initiative and not legislative action,
it does not possess the same legal authority as the Advisory Council. However, the
distinction between the two bodies is unclear as over the years Governors of the
seven Basin States have appointed the same individuals to serve on both the Salinity
Forum and Advisory Council.145 The Salinity Forum meetings are held concurrently
with the Advisory Council meetings on a biannual basis due to their common
membership. 146 In the Salinity Forum, the Advisory Council meetings are the only

137. COLO. RIVER SALINITY CONTROL PROGRAM, BRIEFING DOCUMENT 2 (2018),
http://www.coloradoriversalinity.org/docs/CRBSCP%20Briefing%20Document%202018-04-19.pdf
[hereinafter Briefing Document].
138. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-320, § 204 (a), 88 Stat. 266, 274-275
(1974).
139. U. S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COLO.
RIVER
BASIN
SALINITY
CONTROL
ADVISORY
COUNCIL
CHARTER
2
(2016),
https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/salinity/pdfs/Reports/2017ACReportFinal.pdf (scroll down to Charter).
140. Id.
141. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act § 204 (b).
142. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum, Organization, COLO. RIVER BASIN SALINITY
CONTROL FORUM, http://www.coloradoriversalinity.org/organization.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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avenue for public participation.147 The Advisory Council and Salinity Forum are
supported in their activities by a Technical Advisory Group and a Work Group,
respectively.148
Program Partner Agencies, particularly federal agencies, perform a range
of technical and managerial roles to support the implementation of the Salinity
Program. Reclamation is the lead federal agency for the Salinity Program and
supports the program by funding and implementing improvements to off-farm
irrigation water delivery systems via grants to users through its Basinwide
Program.149 Two other agencies support the implementation of the Salinity Program:
The Natural Resources Conservation Service (“NRCS”) within the Department of
Agriculture and the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”).150 NRCS supports the
Salinity Program by providing technical assistance and funding to private
agricultural landowners to install salinity control measures and improve on-farm
irrigation practices through its NRCS Environmental Quality Incentives Program.151
BLM supports the program by implementing measures to reduce or avoid surface
water runoff and sediment transport associated with the use and disturbance of public
lands from authorized activities.152 United States Geological Survey (“USGS”) and
FWS provide “scientific information, tools, and expertise” necessary to administer
the program and ensure compliance with ESA.153 Finally, the United States
Environment Protection Agency (“EPA”) oversees the implementation and
maintenance of water quality standards for the Colorado River set under the Clean
Water Act.154 The federal agencies responsible for the implementation of the Salinity
Program partner with state agencies in the seven Basin States to work with “hundreds
of water districts, water user organizations and canal and ditch companies, as well as

147. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. 92–463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (The Advisory Council is
a federal advisory committee that is subject to the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
The Advisory Council’s biannual meetings with Federal Program Partner Agencies are therefore open to
members of the public and its meeting minutes are available for public inspection).
148. See COLO. RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL ADVISORY COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE
COLORADO
RIVER
BASIN
SALINITY
CONTROL
PROGRAM,
1
(2017),
https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/salinity/pdfs/Reports/2017ACReportFinal.pdf (The Forum’s Work
Group and Advisory Council’s Technical Advisory Group is made of up technical representatives from
each Basin State. There is limited information, however, on the qualifications of these technical
representatives, the procedure to identify and select members in these technical groups or the term
limitations of these members. It is also unclear if there is an overlap between the technical representatives
in the Salinity Forum and Advisory Council as membership list in these fora are not publicly available).
149. See e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FUNDING OPPORTUNITY ANNOUNCEMENT NO. BORUC-17-F003 BASINWIDE & BASIN STATES SALINITY CONTROL PROGRAMS (2017),
https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/salinity/FOA/2017/FOA_BOR-UC-17-F003.pdf ; BOYD & GREEN,
supra note 69, at 5.
150. Briefing Document, supra note 138, at 2.
151. Nat. Res. Conservation Serv., Colorado River Salinity Control Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
(last
visited
Oct.
13,
2018),
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/co/programs/landscape/?cid=nrcs144p2_062765;
BOYD & GREEN, supra note 69, at 5.
152. BOYD & GREEN, supra note 69, at 5.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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thousands of individual water users and producers” in managing salt concentrations
in the Colorado River.155
Beyond the Basin State representatives in United States and federal partner
agencies, the Salinity Program offers limited opportunities for any other stakeholders
to participate in the collaborative process. Whereas federal implementing agencies
work with thousands of water users, this interaction is not collaborative—in the sense
of a two-way dialogue—because the federal agencies primarily provide financial and
technical support to the users in implementing the predetermined activities of the
Salinity Program that users themselves have no influence over. Other stakeholder
groups, such as environmental and conservation interests, and even Indian Tribes do
not have a seat at the table. The Advisory Council and Salinity Forum meetings serve
as an opportunity for public participation. However, our review of the meeting
minutes and agendas suggests that there have been no public inputs or comments at
these meetings. A Salinity Program stakeholder corroborated our finding and
provided further insight: 156
The Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program does not
really get a ton of public observers. We do have public
meetings with the opportunity for comment, but the public
attendees tend to be engineers that are interested in hearing
about funding opportunities for salinity control projects. As part of
the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program, the Bureau of
Reclamation provides grants for irrigation infrastructure
improvements in order to reduce the percolation and salt leaching
back into the river. Because of that, engineering firms tend to
attend so that they can have a better understanding of what
the Salinity Control Forum would like to see for
future funding applications that they might be helping
farmers submit.
2.

Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program

The Recovery Program’s governance structure includes a main governing
body—the Implementation Committee—that is supported by a Management
Committee and three technical committees.157 The Implementation Committee is a
ten-member body and its stakeholder composition reflects the recognition of nonstate actors, including conservation and water interest groups, as legitimate
participants in the collaborative process. The Implementation Committee includes
one representative each from the FWS, Reclamation, Western Area Power
Administration (“WAPA”), program signatory states of Colorado, Utah, and
Wyoming, as well as one representative each from the water development interest

155. See Program Partners, UPPER COLO. RIVER ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM, (last
visited Oct. 13, 2018) http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/general-information/program-partners.html.
156. Telephone interview with a Salinity Program stakeholder from Colorado, (Nov. 20, 2018) (record
on file with author); See Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program, Council Meeting Minutes, U.S.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/salinity/ (last updated Nov. 26, 2018) (The
Advisory Council meeting minutes are published on the Bureau of Reclamation webpage).
157. FWS, FINAL RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM, supra note 74, at 3-3 (This document is
referred to as the Bluebook on the program Website and other publications).
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group and the conservation interest group.158 Members in the Implementation
Committee are elected based on explicit direction by the foundational programmatic
document, often referred to as the 1987 Bluebook.159 Federal agency representatives
are predetermined in the institutional document: Regional Directors for the FWS and
Reclamation and Area Manager for WAPA.160 State-level representatives for
Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming are appointed by the Governors of each state.161 FWS
appoints the representatives for water development and conservation interest groups
to the Recovery Program from a list of nominees submitted by the two groups that
fall within the jurisdiction of the signatory Basin States.162
In the early years of the program, the National Park Service (“NPS”) and a
power interest group—Colorado River Energy Distributors Association—sought
representation in the Implementation Committee. However, for fear of aggravating
the then existing challenges associated with reaching consensus, members within the
Implementation Committee chose to only include these groups on an “ex-officio”
basis with no voting rights.163 Eight years later, in September 2000, the NPS and
Colorado River Energy Distributors Association received voting privileges.164 The
stakeholder group composition of the Implementation Committee has changed very
little since the inclusion of the NPS and Colorado River Energy Distributors
Association. The only notable change came after Western Resource Advocates
replaced Environmental Defense Fund (“EDF”) in 2014 as the environmental interest
group representative, as the EDF staff member stepped down from the Committee
after having served for over 20 years.165
The Implementation Committee is primarily responsible for overseeing the
implementation of the Recovery Program by the FWS166 and it also recommends the
annual budget priorities and expenditures for the Recovery Program.167 Similar to
the Advisory Council of the Salinity Program, the Implementation Committee does
not have formal decision-making authority in the venue but, notwithstanding this
lack of authority, its recommendations are nonetheless assumed to be carried out by
158. Id. at 3-2.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. COLO. RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., 2-4 (Colo. 1992) (meeting minutes),
http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/committees/implementationcommittee/meetingsum/19920130.pdf.
164. COLO. RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., 1 (Colo. 2000) (meeting minutes),
http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/committees/implementationcommittee/meetingsum/090600ic.pdf.
165. COLO. RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., 2 (Colo. 2014) (meeting minutes),
http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/committees/implementationcommittee/meetingsum/030614IC.pdf.
166. FWS, FINAL RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM, supra note 74, at 3-1 (This document
provides an example of what such “overseeing” responsibility looks like. For example, the Bluebook notes
that the Implementation Committee will be responsible for reviewing instream flow needs provided by
FWS and for recommending how best to secure interests in property to protect those flows).
167. Id (noting other responsibilities of the Implementation Committee, which include assessing how
public education, hatcheries, passageways, and other measures can contribute to recovery, guiding the
research effort, and coordinating all activities).
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the parties in the Recovery Program “if, in the parties’ independent judgement, the
recommendations are justified.”168
The Implementation Committee is supported in its activities by a
Management Committee and three technical committees: Biology, Water
Acquisition, and Information and Education. The technical committees provide
research and technical support. While the foundational program documents—1987
Bluebook169 and Recovery Implementation Program Recovery Action Plan170—
provide limited guidance on how representatives are selected for the management
and technical committees, their term lengths, or voting patterns, it is evident that
members on these committees hail from the same organizations and groups that are
represented in the Implementation Committee and in fact show some overlap in
membership with the Implementation Committee.171 The organizational structure of
the Recovery Program is not set in stone; the Implementation Committee has the
authority to form working groups as needed to provide guidance and assistance to
the Implementation Committee or any of its subgroups.172
To carry out its functions, the Implementation Committee meets twice a
year, whereas the Management Committee and Technical Committees may meet
more frequently.173 These meetings, however, are not open to the public. As the
Implementation Committee and the subcommittees of the Recovery Program were
created pursuant to Sections 2 and 4 of the ESA,174 these committees are exempt
from the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972,175 which
places special emphasis on open meetings, chartering, public involvement, and
reporting.176 Due to the FACA exemption, only meeting minutes of the
168. Id. at 3-2.
169. See Committee Structure, UPPER COLO. RIVER ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM, (last
visited
Oct.
13,
2018)
http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/committees/committeestructure/committee-structure.html.
170. UPPER COLO. RIVER ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM, RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION
PROGRAM SECTION 7 CONSULTATION, SUFFICIENT PROGRESS, AND HISTORIC PROJECTS AGREEMENT
AND RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM RECOVERY ACTION PLAN (RIPRAP) (2018),
http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/documents-publications/foundationaldocuments/RIPRAP/2018FinalRIPRAP.pdf [hereinafter RIPRAP] (This document was originally
finalized on October 15, 1993 and has been updated since to accommodate programmatic biological
opinions as well as annual updated, designation of critical habitat for the endangered fishes, and
development of specific recovery goals for each of the species).
171. See, e.g., Committees, UPPER COLO. RIVER ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM,
http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/committees/committees.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2018)
[hereinafter Committees] (Tom Pitts and Bart Miller serve on both the Implementation Committee and
the Water Acquisition Committee, Leslie James serves on the Implementation Committee and the
Management Committee).
172. FWS, FINAL RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM, supra note 74, at 3-3.
173. See UPPER COLO. RIVER ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM, supra note 170, at
Committees (following links to each committee, select ‘meeting summaries’ to view the frequency of the
respective committee’s meetings).
174. FWS, FINAL RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM, supra note 74, at 3-1.
175. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 4(f)(2), 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533 (2019) (“Recovery teams
appointed pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act [Pub.
L. 92–463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972)].”).
176. See Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. 92–463, 86 Stat. 770 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app.
(1972)).
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Implementation Committee and its subcommittees are available to the public for
viewing. This institutional structure of the Recovery Program thus limits the
opportunities available for interested members of the public or other stakeholder
organizations to provide their inputs to the Program.
The governance and organizational structure of the Recovery Program also
does not consider Indian Tribes a direct stakeholder in the main governing body or
technical teams. There is some indication that Indian Tribes participate in the
implementation of the program by supporting the lead implementation agency, FWS,
in updating the Recovery Implementation Program Recovery Action Plan
(“RIPRAP”),177 and undertaking specific tasks associated with each recovery
element, such as examining the feasibility of various options for obtaining water for
instream flow protection.178
3.

Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program

The Glen Canyon AMP has some similarities in its governance structure
with the Upper Basin Endangered Fish Recovery Program in that it includes a
primary governing body—Adaptive Management Work Group (“AMWG”)—that is
supported by various technical sub-committees.179 Like the Implementation
Committee, the AMWG lacks decision-making authority; it only provides advice and
recommendation to the Secretary of the Interior relative to the operation of Glen
Canyon Dam.180 Unlike the Recovery Program and the Salinity Program, however,
the stakeholder composition of the Glen Canyon AMP goes beyond the traditional
federal and state actors to include non-state actors that represent a diverse set of
interests including, recreation, power production, cultural resources, and endangered
species protection.181 The expansion and diversification of the stakeholder
composition within AMP is an outcome of the constitutional-choice level structure
that protects diverse values182 and recognizes the stake of a diverse set of actors in
the operation of Glen Canyon Dam.183
The AMWG, the main governing body of the Glen Canyon AMP, is a 25member body that includes representatives from 21 stakeholder groups. These
groups include: four U.S. Department of the Interior bureaus, the Secretary of
Energy, Arizona Game & Fish Department, seven Colorado River Basin States, six
Indian Tribes, two federal power purchase contractors, two recreational users, and
177. FWS is the lead agency that is responsible for developing the RIPRAP, and updating it with
inputs from the Management Committee to ensure that the recovery implementation plan continues to
serve as a reasonable and prudent alternative. See RIPRAP supra note 171.
178. Id., at Duchesne 1–2.
179. In discussing its environmental commitments and monitoring, the 1996 Record of Decision
Operation of Glen Canyon Dam Final Environmental Impact Statement, adopts the AMP commitments
provided in the EIS, see RECLAMATION, GLEN CANYON FEIS 1995, supra note 87, at 34–38.
180. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT WORK GROUP
CHARTER,
1–2
(2017), https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/amp/pdfs/amwg_charter.pdf [hereinafter RECLAMATION,
CHARTER].
181. RECLAMATION, GLEN CANYON FEIS 1995, supra note 87, at 36.
182. See Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No 102-575, §§1801-1809, 106 Stat. 4600
(1992).
183. RECLAMATION, GLEN CANYON FEIS 1995, supra note 87, at 36.
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two environmental organizations.184 The selection of representatives from each of
the 21 stakeholder groups is based on the membership criteria and rules laid out in
the AMWG Charter185 and operational procedures.186 These criteria and rules are not
static, and have evolved over the years in three areas. First, in the early years of the
AMWG, prospective representatives had to meet two specific criteria according to
the AMWG Charter: i) individuals had to be qualified through education, knowledge,
or experience to give informed advice on water supply, diversion and delivery
facilities, and their operation and management, or the environmental aspects of such
operations, and ii) individuals had the capability to constructively work in a group
setting toward a common objective of structuring a mechanism for program
implementation.187 These conditions have been eliminated from the AMWG Charter,
and the representative selection process solely depends on the discretion of the
Secretary of the Interior.188 In making the final selection, the Secretary of the Interior
relies on inputs, recommendations, and nominations from the existing stakeholder
groups within the AMWG.189 Scholars studying the first decade and a half of the
stakeholder engagement process within the AMP have criticized the stakeholder
selection process in the AMWG for its lack of transparency190 and the elimination of
qualifying criteria for prospective members makes this criticism even more relevant
today.
Second, when the AMWG was first created, members were appointed for
four-year terms for all groups except environmental, recreational, and power interest
groups that were instead appointed on a “two-year rotating basis to allow more
diverse participation.”191 As the Glen Canyon AMP evolved, membership term
limitations changed to four-year terms for all members, including environmental,
recreational, and power contractors, 192 and then were subsequently reduced to 3-year
terms for all members.193 Although the AMWG Charter defines term-limitations for
representatives, it allows the Secretary of the Interior to re-elect members for more

184. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Adaptive Management Work Group
Members, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/amp/amwg.html (last
updated Aug. 19, 2019).
185. RECLAMATION, CHARTER, supra note 181, at 3–4.
186. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, OPERATING PROCEDURES, 2
(2011), https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/amp/pdfs/OpProced020911.pdf [hereinafter OPERATING
PROCEDURES].
187. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT WORK GROUP CHARTER (1997,
2001) (record on file with author).
188. RECLAMATION, CHARTER, supra note 181, at 3–4.
189. Id. at 4.
190. Camacho, Susskind, & Schenk, Collaborative Planning and Adaptive Management in Glen
Canyon, supra note 15, at 33 (noting that the U.S. Department of the Interior has failed to select
appropriate stakeholders and that it follows a selection process that is “neither complete nor transparent,
and likely the unfortunate result of lobbying behind closed doors”).
191. RECLAMATION, GLEN CANYON FEIS 1995, supra note 87, at 36.
192. OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 187, at 2.
193. RECLAMATION, CHARTER, supra note 181, at 3–4.
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than one term.194 Indeed, a review of membership lists at four points in time195 shows
remarkable stability in the composition of the stakeholder groups that serve on the
AMWG, particularly recreation, environment, and power interests—the three groups
with the highest likelihood of showing a turn-over. Since the inception of the
program, the same organizations that represented power contractors and recreation
interests in 1997 continue to represent the interests even today.196 In case of
environmental groups, the Grand Canyon Wildlands Council has served as a
representative in the AMWG since the inception. 197 The Grand Canyon Trust was
another long-term participant environmental organization in the AMWG that left the
program in 2012 after failed attempts at litigation198 and the group that was brought
in its place—the National Parks Conservation Association— continues to serve even
today.199 The staff members that represent these various non-state organizations,
federal and state agencies, and Indian Tribes also show considerable stability.200
Therefore, even when there are term-limitations for members on the AMWG, the
stability in stakeholder composition indicates the limited practical applicability of
this membership rule, especially with respect to fostering greater diversity in
participation.
Over time, the third important change in the stakeholder participation rules
has occurred with respect to voting patterns. When the AMWG was created, agencies
within the U.S. Department of the Interior had voting rights.201 However, in the most
recent AMWG Charter, these agencies have an ex-officio non-voting member
status.202 An AMWG member that works for a U.S. Department of the Interior
agency noted that this was an important change because “it was very odd for us [i.e.
U.S. Department of the Interior agencies] to be voting on things that would be
recommended to us.”203
194. Id.
195. We reviewed the committee member list for meetings held in 2005, 2012, 2014, and 2018 to
identify changes in stakeholder composition. For 2005 and 2014, we were able to obtain a copy of the
Technical Work Group meeting minutes (held on May, 18 2005 and July, 15 2014 respectively), as
opposed to AMWG members; however, as only those members can serve on the Technical Work Group
(TWG) whose organization is represented in AMWG, we were able to use the TWG meeting minutes to
identify change in stakeholder composition. For 2012 and 2018, we were able to obtain meeting minutes
of the AMWG itself (the meetings were held on August 29–30, 2012 and February 14–15, 2018
respectively). All records are on file with author.
196. CREDA [Colorado River Energy Distributors Association] and UAMPS [Utah Associated
Municipal Power Systems] have represented power interests in the years that we reviewed the meeting
minutes. Since 2000, CREDA also represents power interests in the Upper Basin Recovery Program, See
COLO. RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION COMM. supra notes 165-166.
197. Supra note 196, (In the meeting minutes that we reviewed, Grand Canyon Wildlands Council has
represented one of the two environmental interests in the program; moreover, the staff member
representing this group has also remained the same, i.e. Mr. Larry Stevens).
198. Telephone Interview with AMWG Member #1 (Oct. 18, 2018) (record on file with author).
199. Id. In addition, the change in membership is evident in the meeting minutes from 2012 to 2014.
200. E.g. in 2012 and 2018, Jayne Harkins, Don Ostler, Mike Yeatts, represented the States of Nevada
and New Mexico and the Hopi, respectively. Interestingly, some of these members—Jayne Harkins, Don
Ostler—also serve on the Advisory Council of the Salinity Program; see also supra note 196.
201. See RECLAMATION, CHARTER, supra note 181.
202. RECLAMATION, CHARTER, supra note 181, at 1.
203. Telephone Interview with AMWG Member #2 (Nov. 1, 2018) (record on file with author).
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The AMWG does not act alone; it is supported by the Glen Canyon Dam
Technical Work Group (“TWG”). TWG’s main function is to provide technical
assistance to the AMWG.204 TWG membership consists of one representative from
each organization represented in the AMWG, two representatives from the National
Park Service and one representative from the United States Geological Survey
(“USGS”) are included.205 Each TWG member is nominated by the AMWG
members and approved, or rejected, by the Secretary’s Designee.206 There is no term
limitation for the TWG members so long as their organization is a member of the
AMWG.207 The TWG is authorized to create ad hoc work groups as necessary to
provide technical and managerial assistance.208 These ad hoc groups create
opportunities for bringing in technical advisors outside the TWG that can participate
and provide advice to members of the TWG.209
The AMWG and TWG in turn, are supported by the USGS Grand Canyon
Monitoring and Research Center (“GCMRC”). Established in 1995, GCMRC
measures the effects of Glen Canyon Dam operations on natural and physical
resources along the Colorado River from Glen Canyon Dam to Lake Mead.210
GCMRC’s research director is appointed by the Secretary of the Interior or their
designee from a list of candidates provided through federal hiring authorities with
recommendations by the National Academy of Sciences, Indian Tribes, and other
members of the AMWG.211 GCMRC serves as the “science center” for the Glen
Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program.212 It was created to fulfill the mandate
in the Grand Canyon Protection Act for the establishment and implementation of a
“long-term monitoring and research program” to ensure that Glen Canyon Dam is
operated in a manner that protects the values for which the Grand Canyon National
Park and the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area were created.213 GCMRC
prepares technical reports and recommendations for the Glen Canyon AMP, works
with the TWG to develop criteria and standards for monitoring and research

204. GLEN CANYON DAM TECH. WORK GRP., Operation Procedures, 1 (2013),
https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/amp/pdfs/2006-26-13-TWG-OperatingProcedures.pdf.
[hereinafter
TWG, OPERATING PROCEDURES 2013]. The responsibilities of this group are to develop criteria and
standards for monitoring and research programs; provide periodic review and updates; develop resource
management questions for the design of monitoring and research by the Grand Canyon Monitoring and
Research Center, and provide information, as necessary, for preparing annual resource reports and other
reports, as required for the AMWG.
205. Id. at 2.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 6.
209. Id.; See generally G LEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. PROGRAM TECH. WORK GRP., Ad Hoc
Group List (Apr. 27, 2018), ), https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/amp/twg/2018-04-23-twgmeeting/Attach_01.pdf.
210. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, Gen. Info. Prod. 85, GRAND CANYON MONITORING AND
RESEARCH CTR. (2009), https://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/85/gip85_viewing.pdf [hereinafter USGS, PRODUCT
85].
211. RECLAMATION, GLEN CANYON FEIS 1995, supra note 87, at 37.
212. RECLAMATION, STRATEGIC PLAN FINAL DRAFT 2001, supra note 96, at 5.
213. See USGS, PRODUCT 85, supra note 211.
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programs and resource management questions, serve as a repository for data, and
administers research proposals.214
GCMRC also coordinates review of the monitoring and research activities
with Independent Review Panels (“IRPs”), the independent advisory body within the
Glen Canyon AMP.215 In 2016, the IRP roles were divided between the GCMRC and
a Science Advisors Program.216 Whereas GCMRC oversees IRP responsibilities for
reviewing technical proposals and products for USGS, preparing annual reports for
TWG, conducting five-year reviews of the Adaptive Management Program and
convening expert workshops, the Science Advisors Program provides “independent,
external advice and reviews regarding investigative priorities, knowledge
integration, emerging topics, and adaptive management process.”217 The IRPs,
including the Science Advisors Program, create an opportunity to diversify
stakeholder inputs and oversight in the Glen Canyon AMP. However, as in the case
of TWG ad hoc groups, members are invited to serve on these panels, they cannot
themselves apply for membership.218 Members invited to serve on IRPs are qualified
individuals that are not otherwise a part of long-term monitoring and research
activities of the Glen Canyon AMP. 219 A combination of mechanisms, including
recommendations from AMWG, GCMRC, and TWG, review of professional
literature, and consultation with professional colleagues, are used to identify
potential Science Advisors220 that meet four core criteria: expertise, balance,
independence, and ability to collaborate.221 The Executive Coordinator, GCMRC,
TWG, and Reclamation’s Contracting Officer identify the final list of members
based on a ranking system and mutual agreement.222

214. RECLAMATION, STRATEGIC PLAN FINAL DRAFT 2001, supra note 96, at 5–6.
215. Id.
216. David Braun, Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Mgmt. Program: Sci. Advisors Program Update,
ADAPTIVE
MGMT.
WORKING
GRP.
MEETING
(Feb.
16,
2017),
https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/amp/amwg/2017-02-15-amwg-meeting/Attach_12.pdf
(see
slide
Division of IRP roles) (the Science Advisors Program was previously administered by USGS GCMRC.
Its administration was transferred to Reclamation that in turn selected Sound Science LLC as the
program’s new Executive Coordinator).
217. Id.
218. David Braun & Vineetha Kartha, Science Advisors Program Charter and Operating Protocols
Update, 2016, GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. PROGRAM, 7 (May 25, 2016),
https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/amp/amwg/2016-05-25-amwg-meeting/Attach_05.pdf
[hereinafter
Braun, Science Advisors Program] (noting the protocols and review criteria for selecting members to
serve on the Science Review Panels).
219. Id. at 11.
220. Id. at 7.
221. Id. at 7–8 (noting that members are selected based on their demonstrated expertise “in the fields
of knowledge central to the task at hand as indicated by their records of education, experience, publications
in the peer-reviewed literature, or other relevant, demonstrable achievements.” That they “must be
actively involved in the field(s) of knowledge relevant to the task at hand” and balance “[a] range of
respected scientific and technical viewpoints may exist regarding the available literature and knowledge
concerning the subject at hand.” This includes “expertise in the following disciplines: adaptive
management; anthropology/Native American studies; archaeology; fisheries biology and ecology;
ecosystem/riparian
ecology;
geomorphology;
GIS/remote
sensing;
hydrology;
aquatic
ecology/limnology; and socio-economics”).
222. Id. at 7.
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Glen Canyon AMP’s organizational and governance structure thus differs
from the older collaborative venues in that it creates a decentralized system where a
large number of stakeholders can participate in the process, yet the process affords
limited opportunities for members of the public and other interested organizations to
participate. Only the AMWG and TWG meetings are open to the public, and
participation may require advance approval for oral participation and speaking time
may be limited.223 Further, the current institutional structure does not accept open
membership applications. Members are selected to serve on the advisory body and
technical bodies where the stakeholder composition has remained stable over time.
In case of ad hoc panels and IRPs, invitations are reserved for experts that are not
only identified through recommendations from colleagues within and outside the
Glen Canyon AMP and that meet specific criteria, but also those that are mutually
acceptable to various existing members within the Glen Canyon AMP.
4.

Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program

LCR MSCP’s Funding and Management Agreement (“FMA”) serves as the
guiding document that defines the governance structure for the LCR MSCP.224 The
FMA identifies three major organizational groups for implementing the LCR MSCP:
Reclamation, LCR MSCP Program Manager, and the Steering Committee.225
Reclamation has the primary responsibility for the management and implementation
of the LCR MSCP, which it carries out through a designated Program Manager—an
employee of Reclamation.226 The Steering Committee works with the Program
Manager to coordinate the implementation of the LCR MSCP and reviews
programmatic documents such as annual implementation reports, work plans,
budget, financial reports and accounting, additions/modifications to Conservation
Measures, land and water acquisitions, and reports to Congress and federal and state
agencies.227 The Steering Committee has no decision-making authority with respect
to the management and administration of the LCR MSCP, except with respect to
designating subcommittees and work groups.228
The Steering Committee within the LCR MSCP comprises of 57
stakeholder organizations across seven participant groups: the Federal participant
group, the Arizona participant group, the California participant group, the Nevada
participant group, the Native American participant group, the Conservation
participant group, and the other interested parties participant group.229 Unlike the
Upper Basin Recovery Program, where only one representative from each of the
program signatory states as well as water, power, and conservation interest groups is
given a seat at the table, there is no restriction on the number of stakeholders that can
223. See, e.g., TWG, OPERATING PROCEDURES 2013, supra note 205, at 5 (stating that “[t]he public
may be given opportunity to comment during the discussion period per the Chairperson’s discretion,
generally once all TWG Members have had the chance to speak . . . [a]dvance approval for oral
participation may be prescribed, and speaking time may be limited”).
224. See LCR MSCP, FUNDING AND MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 107.
225. Id. at 14.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 21–22.
228. Id. at 21.
229. Id. at 15–17.
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participate in the Steering Committee of the LCR MSCP. This does not mean the
membership itself is open to any interested group; the FMA imposes certain criteria
to determine the eligibility for membership.
Only federal agencies can participate under the Federal participant group.230
State-based membership is open to organizations that are engaged in activities that
are covered under the incidental take authorization for the LCR MSCP.231 In the
cases of Tribe-based membership and membership for conservation and
environmental organizations, the eligibility for participation is predicated on a
geographic restriction: only those Tribes and organizations that are geographically
situated in232 or have an interest in the Lower Colorado River region can participate
in LCR MSCP.233 The Steering Committee reviews and approves applications by
suitable organizations to participate in the LCR MSCP.234
Membership in the state-based participant group of the Steering Committee
is unique compared to the other collaborative venues in the Basin. Unlike the Glen
Canyon AMP, the Recovery Program and the Salinity Program where federal funds
and appropriations cover program costs,235 in the LCR MSCP, the state-based groups
as a whole bear fifty percent of the total Program Cost236 and each participating
stakeholder in these groups is required to make a proportional financial contribution
to fund the activities of the LCR MSCP.237 This creates a pay to play situation
wherein prospective stakeholders share the financial burden of the program, and in
turn receive ESA compliance for their actions and a seat at the table. The state-based
participant group has 43 stakeholder organizations that participate in the LCR
MSCP,238 the highest number of the any other participant group. These 43
stakeholder organizations have also remained stable in that the same groups that
came to the table in 2005 still have a seat at the table today.239

230. Id. at 18.
231. Id. at 10, 17-18.
232. Id. at 18 (“Members within the Native American Participant Group must be Native American
tribes whose lands are located adjacent to, or who divert water from, the [Lower Colorado River]”).
233. Id.
234. STEERING COMM., LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM, BY-LAws
4 (2005), https://www.lcrmscp.gov/publications/bylaws.pdf [hereinafter BY-LAws].
235. See U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. GRAND CANYON MONITORING
AND RES. CTR., GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. PROGRAM TRIENNIAL BUDGET & WORK PLAN—
FISCAL
YEARS
2018–2020
1
(2017), https://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/17sep20/TWP.pdf (noting Glen Canyon AMP
funding sources). For information on funding for the Upper Basin Recovery Program, see Act of Oct. 30,
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-392, 114 Stat. 1602; see also Endangered Fish Recovery Programs Extension Act
of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–270, 126 Stat. 2444 (2013); see also supra note 74. For information on funding
for the Salinity Program see Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-320, § 205, 88
Stat. 266 (1974); see Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 104–20, 109 Stat. 255, 255–
256 (1995).
236. See supra note 225, at 31 (remaining funds are contributed by federal agencies).
237. Id. at 31–34.
238. LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM, Steering Committee
Governance https://www.lcrmscp.gov/steer_committee/governance.html html (last updated Dec. 21,
2018) (follow tabs under participant groups to see the list of current members in each group).
239. See supra note 107, at 15–17.
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Over the years, the stakeholder composition of the LCR MSCP has evolved
as a result of inclusion of a greater number of environmental and conservation
organizations and Indian Tribes into the Steering Committee.240 While conservation
organizations and Indian Tribes do not make financial contributions to the program
like organizations in the state-based participant group, they nonetheless need to
support their ongoing expenses to participate in Steering Committee meetings.241
LCR MSCP annually hosts and supports the Colorado River Terrestrial and
Riparian meeting and the Colorado River Aquatic Biologists meeting respectively.
These meetings are conferences that provide opportunities for collaboration,
communication, and information sharing between individuals and groups working
on fisheries, native habitat restoration and natural resources monitoring and research
related to the Lower Colorado River Watershed.242 In addition to stakeholders that
work together through the Steering Committee, these conferences provide an avenue
primarily to include insights from the latest research and perspectives from the
scientific community. Unlike Glen Canyon AMP where an invitation is required to
participate in the IRPs and ad hoc groups, the Colorado River Aquatic Biologists
meeting and the Colorado River Terrestrial and Riparian meeting are open to all
interested technical experts.
The LCR MSCP provides opportunities for public input in the Steering
Committee meetings,243 which are held at least once every year.244 However, notice
of scheduled meetings is only provided to those members of the public or interested
individuals that request such a notice either via mail or electronically.245 There is no
other notice posted for the benefit of the general public. For members of the public
not conversant with the by-laws, limited direction is provided on how to sign up for,
or attend, Steering Committee meetings. 246 This places the burden of participation
on members of the public and other interested individuals to identify how they may
provide inputs. A review of Steering Committee meeting notes over the last decade
suggests that there were no public comments to any of the agenda items; this finding
240. In 2005, conservation organizations including Ducks Unlimited, Desert Wildlife Unlimited,
Lower Colorado RC&D, QuadState County Coalition, the Haulapai Tribe, and Colorado River Indian
Tribes received membership in the Steering Committee. In 2009, the Nature Conservancy was brought on
board followed by the Chemehuevi Indian Tribe in 2011. See LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES
CONSERVATION
PROGRAM, Steering
Comm.
Events
and
MeetingsDecisions,
https://www.lcrmscp.gov/steer_committee/decisions.html (last updated June 19, 2019).
241. Supra note 235, at 12.
242. See Colo. River Aquatic Biologists (CRAB) Meeting Info., LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES
CONSERVATION PROGRAM, https://www.lcrmscp.gov/crab/crab.html (last updated Sept. 10, 2019); See
also Colo. River Terrestrial & Riparian Meeting Info., LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES
CONSERVATION PROGRAM, https://www.lcrmscp.gov/crtr/crtr.html (last updated Jan. 22, 2019).
243. See supra note 235, at 10, § 5.1.2 (“Each meeting of the Steering Committee must be open to the
public, and any person attending a Steering Committee meeting may file a written statement, or provide
reasonable and timely oral input regarding topics on the meeting agenda”).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 10–11.
246. See Meeting & Event Calendar Upcoming Events, LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES
CONSERVATION PROGRAM, https://www.lcrmscp.gov/calendar.html (last updated Apr. 19, 2019) (The
meeting and event calendar for the LCR MSCP shows the upcoming Steering Committee meeting date
and time. However, there is limited information on this page on how to sign up for, or attend these
meetings. The location of the meeting—”McCarran Airport, Las Vegas, NV”— as well, is ambiguous).
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was substantiated by the LCR MSCP staff commenting that “we don’t really get
anyone outside the Steering Committee at the meetings, we haven’t had any
[attendance from the public] in quite a few years.”247
5.

U.S.-Mexico Binational Forum for the Colorado River Delta

The IBWC is the primary agency that is responsible for the application of
boundary and water treaties between United States and Mexico and the settlement of
differences that may arise in the application of the treaties.248 In 2010, Minute 317
formalized the stakeholder engagement process to address water issues on the
Colorado River, including the Delta, and recognized non-state actors as legitimate
stakeholders in the collaborative forum. Minute 317 created two organizational
groups to support IBWC: the binational Consultative Council and the binational
Work Groups.249
The binational Consultative Council is composed of representatives from
the United States and Mexico and includes members from IBWC, the respective
federal governments and the Basin States.250 Non-state actors are not part of the
Consultative Council. The Consultative Council reports to the IBWC and facilitates
consideration of legal, administrative, and policy matters associated with the issues
considered in the binational forum.251 Under Minute 323, the binational Consultative
Council was replaced by the Minute No. 323 Oversight Group.252
The binational work groups, on the other hand, perform a more technical
function and allow for broader stakeholder participation. Minute 317 included four
binational Work Groups: Water Conservation, New Water Source, System
Operations, and Environmental.253 The Work Groups identify binational cooperative
projects and initiatives that can be undertaken by United States and Mexico to
address a range of water quality and quality issues.254 IBWC coordinates the
exploration and evaluation of potential areas of cooperation and the consideration of
projects across the Work Groups.255 The Work Group structure has evolved as

247. Telephone Interview with LCR MSCP Staff (Jan. 9, 2018) (record on file with author); Steering
Comm. Events & Meetings- Agendas & Notes, LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION
PROGRAM, https://www.lcrmscp.gov/steer_committee/agendas_notes.html (last updated June 19, 2019)
(scroll down each date to view the agendas and notes).
248. About Us, INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’N, https://www.ibwc.gov/home.html (last visited
Dec. 27, 2018).
249. Supra note 133, at 1-3.
250. Id. at 2–3.
251. Id.;
252. Interview with Minute No. 323 Stakeholder, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Dec. 13, 2018) (record on file
with author). It must be noted that the organizational structure for the implementation of Minute 323 is
not publicly available and could not be shared by stakeholder interviewed as part of the project. See also
Executive Director’s Report to the Colorado River Board of California 3 (Aug. 15,
2018) http://www.crb.ca.gov/board_meetings/2018/20180815-ed-report.pdf (noting
that
the
Environmental Work Group plans will go to the Minute No. 323 Oversight Group for final approval, thus
corroborating the creation of a Minute No. 323 Oversight Group).
253. Supra note 133, at 2.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 3.
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Minute 323 has reconstituted the groups under six categories: Hydrology, Salinity,
Flow Variability, Environment, Projects, and All-American Canal Turnout.256
The primary stakeholders in the six binational Work Groups include
representatives from federal and state governments from the United States and
Mexico.257 The stakeholder composition in these Work Groups is not fixed; different
agencies, or individuals with specific skill sets may be brought on board with
emerging technical and managerial demands.258 Indian Tribes and members of the
general public are not included in any of the Work Groups.259 Although a current list
of stakeholders in these Work Groups is unavailable publicly, two Environmental
Work Group (“EWG”) participants provided insight on the composition of the EWG,
which includes representatives from IBWC (United States and Mexico),
Reclamation, Mexico’s National Commission of Natural Protected Areas, Mexico’s
National Water Commission, the Colorado River Board of California, the Upper
Colorado River Commission, water users from California, Arizona, and Nevada,
scientists and technical experts, and a binational coalition of NGOs. 260 In addition to
the EWG, the binational coalition of NGOs is also involved in the Projects Work
Group alongside traditional state actors.261
Since their inclusion in the collaborative forum in 2008, NGOs have taken
on a crucial role in the collaborative forum over the years in protecting and restoring
the Colorado River Delta, which makes their participation in this forum unique
compared to other venues in the Basin. Under Minute 323, NGOs share
responsibility with federal actors in meeting water delivery commitments to restore
the Delta.262 In addition, NGOs have also pledged to provide six million dollars in
funding for scientific research and monitoring as well as implementation of
restoration projects.263
Unlike the Glen Canyon AMP where some guidance is available on the
selection process of stakeholders in the Technical Work Group, there is no
information available on the qualifications and background of prospective members
in the Work Groups constituted under the Binational Forum. Membership
256. Supra note 135, at 2.
257. Id.; See also Telephone Interview with Environmental Work Group Member #1 (Dec. 5, 2018)
(record on file with author). Typically, federal agencies include IBWC, Reclamation, Mexico’s National
Commission of Natural Protected Areas (CONANP), Mexico’s National Water Commission
(CONAGUA), and USGS, which provides relevant scientific studies as required.
258. Interview with Minute No. 323 Stakeholder, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Dec. 13, 2018).
259. Id.
260. Telephone Interview with Environmental Work Group Member #1 (Dec. 5, 2018); Telephone
Interview with Environmental Work Group Member #2 (Dec. 7, 2018) (record on file with author).
(Member #1 indicated that the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, Southern Nevada
Water Authority, and Arizona Department of Water Resources typically represent water user interests in
California, Nevada, and Arizona respectively. Notable binational environmental NGOs that are involved
in the Work Group include Pronatura Noroeste, National Audubon Society, Sonoran Institute, and the
Nature Conservancy).
261. IBWC, Minute 323, supra note 135, at 16-17.
262. Id. at 16.
263. Id.; See About Us, RAISE THE RIVER, https://raisetheriver.org/about-raise-the-river/ (last visited
Dec. 18, 2018) (Six NGOs in the United States and Mexico—Pronatura Noroeste, Sonoran Institute, the
Redford Center, National Audubon Society, and the Nature Conservancy—have formed the Raise the
River Coalition to raise funding for restoration activities in the Delta).
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composition lists, meeting minutes, and agendas of the Minute No. 323 Oversight
Group, or any of the Work Groups, are unavailable publicly. This said, the two EWG
participants who were interviewed as part of this project indicated that members
selected to serve on the Work Group have had a long history of working together,
beginning with the creation of the Colorado River Delta Research Coordination
Network in 2005 and subsequent work on the Santa Clara Wetland.264 Consequently,
the EWG formed “organically.”265 Over the years, membership in the EWG has
evolved with the attrition of some participants as well as the addition of new
individuals that are brought in to address specific skill gaps. The new individuals are
selected based on recommendation from members within the EWG and colleagues
outside the EWG.266 Members in the EWG, or the Science Team formed under
Minute 319, typically include scientists from universities, NGOs, and federal
agencies in the United States and Mexico.267
The IBWC, Minute No. 323 Oversight Group, and binational Work Groups
themselves do not provide opportunities for public participation and input. However,
at least two indirect mechanisms268 exist for public engagement in the binational
cooperation around the Colorado River and the Delta. The first mechanism is the
Colorado River Citizens Forum that was established in 2003 to facilitate the
exchange of information between the United States IBWC and members of the public
about Commission activities in Yuma County, Arizona and Imperial County,
California.269 The second mechanism is through engagement with EWG members in
their ongoing restoration efforts. For example, Raise the River partners with Sonoran
Institute and Pronatura Noroeste to work with local communities in the areas of the
Delta to undertake restoration efforts, conduct environmental education programs,
and participate in other activities such as becoming nature tourism guides. 270

264. Telephone Interview with Environmental Work Group Member #1 (Dec. 5, 2018); Telephone
Interview with Environmental Work Group Member #2 (Dec. 7, 2018).
265. Telephone Interview with Environmental Work Group Member #2 (Dec. 7, 2018).
266. Telephone Interview with Environmental Work Group Member #1 (Dec. 5, 2018).
267. Id.; Karl Flessa, Eloise Kendy, & Karen Schlatter, Interim Int’l Coop. Measures in the Colo.
River Basin through 2017 and Extension of Minute 318 Coop. measures to address the continued effects
of the Apr. 2010 Earthquake in the Mexicali Valley, Baja California, I NT’L BOUNDARY & WATER
COMM’N, MINUTE 319 (2012), Ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute_319.pdf.; Karen Schlatter, The
Vegetation Response to Environmental Flows and Restoration Actions in the Colorado River Delta
(2015), https://www.lcrmscp.gov/crtr/presentations/2015/crtr15_14.pdf (see slide 2 for the composition
of the Minute 319 Science Team).
268. There may be additional mechanisms for public participation; however, at the time of writing,
only two mechanisms could be identified for public engagement.
269. Colorado River Citizens Forum Meetings, INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’N,
https://www.ibwc.gov/Citizens_Forums/CF_Colorado.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2018).
270. Our Work, RAISE THE RIVER, https://raisetheriver.org/our-work/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2018).
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Table 2: Organizational Components and Stakeholder Composition in the
Collaborative Venues

IV. COMPARING VENUES AND CRAFTING A FUTURE RESEARCH
AGENDA
The five formal collaborative venues examined in this paper were created
in response to emerging resource concerns that range from addressing a narrow set
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of issues (such as water quality issues through the Salinity Program and endangered
species protection through the Recovery Program and LCR MSCP), to addressing a
broader set of natural and cultural resource issues (like in the Glen Canyon AMP and
the Binational Forum). Across the five collaborative venues, we observe a
broadening in the stakeholder composition over time. Yet, we also observe
unevenness in the pattern of stakeholder participation. In this concluding section, we
first discuss the shifts in both stakeholder composition and stakeholder relationships,
followed by a discussion of the unevenness in participation. Our comparative
assessment aims to exemplify trends across venues rather than delve into the specific
strengths or weaknesses of each venue. We build on the insights from this
comparative assessment to offer an agenda for future research around stakeholder
participation and collaborative governance in the Colorado River Basin.
A.

Stakeholder Participation Across the Collaborative Venues: Tracing
Changes in Actors and Participation Over Time

In the Colorado River Basin, institutional design at the constitutional and
collective-choice levels dictates the governance and organizational structure of
collaborative venues. Across the five collaborative venues, we observe a marked
shift in the stakeholder composition over time. In addition to federal and state
agencies, we see a gradual increase in the inclusion of Indian Tribes and non-state
actors across the venues. This shift, illustrated in Tables 2 and 3, is an outcome of
changes in internal factors—most notably the evolution in institutional structure at
the constitutional-level over time—that allowed for a broader definition of water
issues and a greater recognition of the diverse interests, including those of non-state
actors, in addressing those issues. The notable external driver of this shift is the
transformation in environmental groups’ position: from that of an adversary to that
of an engaged collaborator that provides expertise, knowledge, and in some cases,
funding to support activities of the venue.
The older collaborative programs—Salinity Program and Recovery
Program—were created to address specific problems, reduce salinity and protect
endangered species, respectively. The techno-managerial definition of the problem
has effectively limited stakeholder participation to those groups which have a direct
stake in addressing the issue, along with federal agencies that can provide the
necessary techno-managerial support in implementing the programs. As a result,
since the 1970s and 1980s, the dominant participants in these collaborative venues
have been representatives from the Basin States and federal agencies—particularly
from Reclamation, FWS, USGS, and BLM. State-level representatives are either
political appointees serving at the discretion of the incumbent Governors or are
selected through a selection process that lacks transparency. Participation of nonstate stakeholders is especially restricted; the Salinity Program does not include any
non-state actors and only one interest group each from the water and environmental
sectors is allowed to participate in the Recovery Program. Members of the public
lack opportunities to participate and Indian Tribes remain conspicuously absent from
these venues.
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Table 3: Patterns of Stakeholder Participation Across the Five Collaborative
Venues

In contrast, we observe an increased diversity of stakeholders in programs
implemented since the 1990s as the constitutional-level arrangements authorizing
these programs considered a wider set of issues (such as in the case of Glen Canyon
AMP), and recognized the need to include environmental interests in the venues
(such as in LCR MSCP). In these newer collaborative venues, federal and state
agencies continue to remain the dominant stakeholder groups, which is unsurprising
since they retain the decision-making authority and program implementation
responsibility under existing legal arrangements. However, we observe greater room
for direct participation by Indian Tribes, recreation interests (particularly in the Glen
Canyon AMP), as well as environmental organizations in these venues, and more
indirect participation by members of the public in committee meetings and
restoration efforts.
Beyond institutional change itself, the Binational Forum shows greater
inclusion of non-state actors as a result of specific external drivers. Most notably,
disengagement of litigious environmental organizations from the process has
allowed a smaller set of NGOs to work collaboratively and perform much needed
governance functions and restoration activities, which in turn gave them a seat at the
binational table in the early years. Under Minute 323, NGOs have assumed a more
central role in the Binational Forum with their commitment to providing two critical
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resources for protecting the Delta: water and funding for research and restoration
activities.
Despite the trend toward inclusion of a greater number of new actors in the
collaborative venues in the Basin over the years, we observe an unevenness in
participation within and across venues. Within individual collaborative venues,
although Indian Tribes—a traditionally marginalized group in decision-making—
and environmental groups have a seat at the table, they lack strength in numbers.271
For example, in the LCR MSCP Steering Committee, Indian Tribes and
environmental organizations represent only eight organizations within the overall
group of fifty-seven stakeholders. In addition, the process of selecting organizations
for representing specific interests lacks transparency and the final selection decision
rests with federal agency representatives which has the potential to undermine the
democratic nature of the collaborative.272 Moreover, a seat at the table alone does not
guarantee that the voices and perspectives of these actors are heard. For example, an
ongoing challenge within the Glen Canyon AMP is the mismatch between the value
systems of Indian Tribes and other stakeholders.273 Only recently was a real attempt
made to include values of Indian Tribes in decision-making, as in the case of
mechanical removal of non-native fish.274 Consequently, the unevenness in

271. An additional observation through our discussions with scholars that have worked on Colorado
River Basin issues for decades, is that the environmental NGOs that participate in these collaborative
venues typically tend to be well funded compared to Indian Tribes that lack similar sources of stable
financial support. Consequently, even when Indian Tribes and environmental groups may have a seat at
the table, their actual ability to participate in ongoing workings of the collaborative varies based on access
to secure funding.
272. Purdy, supra note 59, at 411 (noting that “the degree of democracy in a collaborative process can
be determined in part by who is invited to participate” and that participation itself is determined by leaders
whose interpretations of that situation can determine which stakeholders are invited to collaborate and
which are excluded); Susskind, Camacho, & Schenk, supra note 15, at 33 (in the case of Glen Canyon
Dam, these scholars highlight this concern by noting that the U.S. Department of the Interior had failed
to select appropriate stakeholders and that it follows a selection process that lacked transparency and was
likely the unfortunate result of lobbying behind closed doors).
273. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL TRIBAL CONSULTATION PLAN FOR THE GLEN CANYON
DAM
ADAPTIVE
MGMT.
PROGRAM,
4
(2015),
http://gcdamp.com/images_gcdamp_com/7/7e/Final_GCDAMP_Tribal_Consult_Plan_10-23-2015.pdf
(This tension is recognized in the first tribal consultation plan of the Glen Canyon AMP that took over a
decade of discussions and deliberations to prepare and was published in 2015, nearly 20 years after the
program was created. The plan defined consultations as “the process of seeking, discussing, and
considering the views of Native Americans and Tribes . . . built upon the exchange of ideas, not simply
providing information.” Among other things, the plan included a section on Traditional Ecological
Knowledge (TEK). The plan recognized that the Tribes involved in the AMP advocated for the inclusion
of their TEK, when they choose to offer it and expect that their insights are treated with the same kind of
respect as the knowledge derived from western scientists engaged in AMP. The plan further recognized
the tension between TEK and the western scientific approach and suggested that “these differences may
be addressed through mutual respect coupled with appropriate consultation and collaboration.” For the
first time, the stakeholders that drafted the strategic plan acknowledged that TEK could “lead to more
inclusive approaches to management decisions that have in the past relied almost exclusively on western
scientific principles”).
274. Indian Tribes, especially Hopi and Zuni Tribe have criticized experiments that mechanically
remove non-native fish species, such as brown trout and green sunfish, as they view these fish as a “fully
alive component of the of the ecosystem, which were there through no fault of their own, and shouldn’t
be needlessly punished” (See Tribal perspectives on nonnative fish removal, Tribal Resources, GLEN
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participation within the same venue raises a host of process-oriented questions
related to representatives, and accountability of member selection as well as actual
power sharing between stakeholders that will be discussed further in Section B
below.
When we look across the collaborative venues in the Basin, the problem of
unevenness in participation compounds. First, the emphasis of the venues in terms
of their geographic scope on the United States portion of the Colorado River limits
opportunities to include Mexican stakeholders in the collaborative process. Except
the Binational Forum, no other venue currently offers opportunities to include
perspectives, concerns, or ideas from Mexican resource users. This may not be a
trivial omission as long-term sustainability in the Basin will require cooperation by
stakeholder within and beyond the United States.
Second, across all the venues, we observe longevity in stakeholder
participation; that is, there is remarkable stability in both state and non-state
organizations that participate in the venues. We also observe the presence of the same
set of representatives across all collaborative venues studied here, suggesting an
overlap in stakeholder participation. For example, power interests in the Upper Basin
Recovery Program and Glen Canyon AMP are represented by the Colorado River
Energy Distributors Association; environmental interests that participate in LCR
MSCP (or that have previously participated in the Upper Basin Recovery Program)
are also part of the environmental stakeholder group working on the Delta.275
Politically appointed representatives of Basin States in the Salinity Program, for
example, also represent the said Basin State in the Upper Basin Recovery Program
and Glen Canyon AMP. This longevity or continuity in stakeholder participation can
be valuable in a collaborative process to build social capital,276 especially, trust.277
As one long-time AMP participant notes:
There’s a lot of trust that’s been built through this program through
regularly meeting with all these different stakeholders for the past
15, 20 years . . . I think that has really helped as well, including
that we have a lot of, um, a fair amount of longevity in membership
so that there are certain people that have been there for 20 years,
you know, and there are people that, some people that are newer,
but there’s still a kind of through line that brings a lot of
institutional knowledge and a lot of solidarity to the group.278

CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WIKI, http://gcdamp.com/index.php?title=Tribal_Resources (last
visited Dec. 28, 2018). In the last few years, an attempt has been made to limit non-beneficial killing, such
as by transporting non-native fish to Tribal aviaries, See e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., Nonnative Fish,
https://www.nps.gov/glca/learn/nature/nonnativefish.html (last updated Jan. 19, 2017) (stating that one of
the most common ways to address the negative tribal impact from taking fish in management actions is
identifying beneficial uses for the removed fish, such as providing the fish to a tribal aviary to feed injured
eagles).
275. For e.g. the Nature Conservancy.
276. Leach, Pelkey, & Sabatier, supra note 38, at 661 (noting that partnerships that were older than 6
years had higher perceived effects at building human and social capital compared to partnerships that were
younger than 2 years).
277. Ansell & Gash, supra note 17, at 558–559.
278. Telephone Interview with AMWG Member #3 (Oct. 16, 2018).
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With the disengagement of litigious groups or “hardliners” and the
consequent weakening of “threat of litigation,” the long-term participants in these
venues have been able to revise the participation process to enable consensus
building and “good-faith” conversations.279 The venues are considered more
cooperative by the participants, and the lack of litigation across the venues is often
used as evidence in this regard.280
Likewise, overlap in stakeholders across the venues can produce positive
spillover effects: cooperation in one venue, for example, can enhance cooperation by
the same stakeholders in other venues as well.281 As one AMP participant notes:
I’d say that [overlap in membership] does [help], especially for the
state. You get a lot of overlap in these different programs and so it
helps to build relationships not just within these programs but also
outside of them leading to spend a bit more time together. A lot of
the folks that have been attending these meetings for 10 or 15 years
are now working to develop things like the Drought Contingency
Plan. You know, they, the same people that do these are some of
the same people that worked on the 2007 guidelines. So at least for
the states it seems like it’s been, you know, it’s good to meet
regularly and just build that foundation of relationships on things
that are maybe are a little bit lower stakes than negotiating this
kind of bedrock pieces of the Law of the River.282
Notwithstanding the aforementioned benefits, longevity and overlap in
stakeholder membership across the venues may limit the inclusion of perspectives
and voices from new stakeholders in these venues, an issue recognized by a

279. Telephone Interview with AMWG Member #1 (Oct. 18, 2018).
280. For e.g. in its self-assessment, the Upper Basin Recovery Program considers itself a
“demonstrated success” and goes on to argue that due to this success, “the Upper Colorado River
Endangered Fish Recovery Program has become a national model for its collaborative conservation efforts
to protect endangered species.” See About the Endangered Fish Recovery Program, supra note 84.
Scholars outside the program substantiate this assessment by pointing to the lack of litigation as evidence
for successful collaboration. Tart, for example, notes “[q]uite remarkably, and likely due to the successful
collaborative process, no lawsuits have been filed on ESA compliance for any of these [2025] water
projects [that deplete more than 3.7 million acre-feet per year].”
J. Keith Tart, The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program: Twenty-Five Years in the
Making, UNIV. OF DENV. WATER L. REV. (Jan. 16 2014), http://duwaterlawreview.com/the-uppercolorado-river-endangered-fish-recovery-program-twenty-five-years-in-the-making/;
Telephone
Interview with AMWG Member #1 (Oct. 18, 2018) (In an interview with an AMP participant, the
participant noted the lack of any litigation associated with the program since 2012 as a sign that the
program had become more collaborative and cooperative over the years).
281. Mark Lubell, Governing Institutional Complexity: The Ecology of Games Framework, 41 POLICY
STUD. J. 537–559, 546 (2013) (noting that actors with extensive experience in a particular ecology of
games will have a sophisticated set of strategies in making decisions, which will apply to belief and
attitudes (e.g. how trustworthy a particular type of actor is considered to be)); But see also an example of
negative spillover, Mark Lubell, Adam Douglas Henry & Mike McCoy, Collaborative Institutions in an
Ecology of Games, 54 AM. J. OF POL. SCI . 287–300 (2010) (noting based on survey data from policy
actors in five California regions that higher levels of cooperation in collaborative institutions are
associated with lower levels of cooperation in other more traditional land‐use and transportation planning
institutions).
282. Telephone Interview with AMWG Member #3 (Oct. 16, 2018).
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Binational Forum participant.283 This issue is particularly problematic because
constitutional-level structures—which define, and in turn limit, both the topics and
interest groups that are considered in the venues—have not changed over time.
Consequently, in situations when the same stakeholders participate across the
collaborative venues over a long period of time, further research is needed to
understand whether the longevity and overlap produce positive outcomes or whether
they create an echo chamber where some ideas (and even solutions) may dominate
across the collaborative venues. Likewise, where the venues are considered more
cooperative and collaborative due to lack of overt conflict in the form of litigation,
greater research can also help us to understand the environmental outcomes of the
venue.284
B.

Crafting a Future Research Agenda

Based on our study of the institutional design for stakeholder participation
in five formal collaborative venues in the Colorado River Basin, we propose a
research agenda around both the process and the outcomes associated with these
collaborative venues. It is undeniable that collaborative processes in the Basin have
and will continue to include a wider range of stakeholders in the future. But in these
stakeholder processes, who participates and how will influence the quality of ultimate
decisions. When a relatively small group of stakeholders either serves as advisors in
the decision-making process, or makes the final decisions that impact 40 million
people, such as in the Colorado River Basin, process-oriented research will need to
examine whether these stakeholders legitimately represent the interests of their
constituency.
Researchers might ask: Does the composition of stakeholders at the table
adequately represent the diverse water needs and interests in the Basin? Are the
selected stakeholders capable of fashioning solutions that are creative and reflect
the reality and future of the Basin, or do they solely further the interests of their
individual organizations or a narrow interest group? Does the process of selecting
stakeholders enable or limit participation by legitimate interests that may not have
historically been a part of the program? While these questions get to the
representation side of the participation equation, further research is similarly needed
to understand how stakeholders participate and with what effect.
We simply do not know enough about the issues addressed over time in
these collaborative venues or whether the inclusion of newer stakeholders in the
programs, such as Indian Tribes, concurrently involves giving these groups any real
power in the agenda setting or decision-making process. This warrants research on
questions like: Has there been a shift in the issues on the agenda? Do we see new
issues being taken up as a result of inclusion of diverse stakeholders? To answer
these more process-based questions, researchers would need to systematically
examine membership lists, meeting minutes, and meeting materials over time in the
collaborative venues. It will also require interviews with participants that do not have
283. Interview with a Minute No. 323 Stakeholder, Las Vegas, Nev. (Dec. 13, 2018).
284. Singleton, supra note 19, at 55 (the author notes that an important critique of collaborative
processes is that they shift the definition of success from one of an improvement in environmental
conditions to one of reduced social conflict).
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a seat at the table as well as those who do to better understand not only the patterns
of stakeholder representation via-a-vis the diverse water interests in the Basin but
also how—or how not— stakeholder concerns or ideas are incorporated into
decision-making in these collaborative venues over time and across issues.
In terms of outcomes, further research will need to examine both the social
and ecological outcomes of the collaborative process. Within and across the
collaborative venues, it would be valuable to know if social capital in the form of
trust, learning, and capacity are being built in the venues. Through survey research
and interviews, researchers could ask: What are the participants’ perceptions
towards efforts on building trust and capacity? Do collaborative processes support
learning? What are the impediments to improving shared leaning, trust, and capacity
building?
Even when collaborative venues enhance social outcomes, the purported
benefits of a collaborative approach may be limited if the collaborative decisions
reflect “lowest common denominator” solutions or fail to produce actual
improvements in ecological conditions. To enhance our understanding of the quality
and ecological outcomes of collaborative decisions, scholars can interview
participants within and outside the collaborative, review decision documents of these
venues over time, and examine progress reports to answer questions such as—Do
the decisions of the collaborative reflect the interests of the broader stakeholder
group? Do the decisions reflect options that are shown to produce better
environmental results? If not, what are the impediments? Against a broader set of
ecological or environmental indicators, have there been improvements in the health
of the ecosystem as a result of the decision made in these collaborative venues?
While our research focuses on the five formal collaborative venues on the
mainstem of the Colorado River that offer ongoing opportunities for stakeholder
participation, it would be naïve of us to assume that these are the only venues where
consequential decisions are forged. The questions we raise are equally relevant,
applicable, and deserve attention in collaborative processes that are informal (e.g.
the Colorado River Water Users Association meetings), regional or state-based in
scope (e.g. the Basin Roundtables in the state of Colorado), limited in duration (2012
Basin Study), meet federal requirements for stakeholder consultation under NEPA
or are ad hoc in structure (such as the 2001 Interim Surplus Guidelines or Drought
Contingency Planning processes).
As climate change, declining water availability and increasing aridity loom
over the Colorado River Basin, tough decisions lie ahead for the management and
allocation of existing water supplies. In a basin characterized by decentralized
decision-making processes and longstanding historic conflict, collaboration will be
necessary to address the complex water issues facing the Basin. Questions like those
posed in this research are necessary if we are to develop and re-shape stakeholder
collaboratives and partnerships that balance competing uses and values of water and
effectively address emerging challenges in ongoing and upcoming processes such as
the Drought Contingency Planning and re-negotiations of 2007 Interim Guidelines.

